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I. INTRODUCTION

parents1 present

Minor
a legal conundrum. While many expectant teens
believe they will be automatically emancipated upon the birth of their
child, parenthood does not emancipate minors.' Rather, minor parents
remain children in the eyes of the law and as such are dependent upon
adults to act on their behalves. In most of the fifty states minor parents
cannot bring or sustain a lawsuit, enroll themselves in school, or enter into
1. While pregnant foster youth are by definition female, "expecting" or parenting foster
youth include young women and young men. Anecdotal evidence indicates that the majority of
parenting wards who seek to live with their children are female. For this reason, and for
convenience, this Article centers around the needs of pregnant and parenting girls in foster care.
Nevertheless, the authors believe that fathering wards should have access to the same services and
placement options as their female counterparts, as well as special programs designed to meet their
particular needs.
2. See infra Part III.B.
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binding contracts. Somewhat ironically, these same adolescents are legally
responsible for their offspring. Thus, a teen mother who is unable to
consent to her own appendectomy may consent to her child's
appendectomy. Additionally, minor parents are accountable to charges of
child abuse and neglect to the same extent as other parents.
This conundrum is further complicated when the young parents in
question are wards of the state. Is a baby born to a foster child entrusted
to the care of his mother or to the care of the state? If the infant is in his
mother's custody, what is the state's role in caring for the infant? Another
complication arises in those states where youth may remain in foster care
until the age of twenty-one. While foster children who have reached the
age of eighteen are adults in the eyes of the law, they remain entitled to the
protections and subject to restrictions imposed by the foster care system.
The support and supervision that young mothers receive from the system
can be invaluable. On the other hand, mothers in foster care are exposed
to constant scrutiny, with social workers and foster parents on hand to
report any real or perceived maltreatment of the wards' infants.
The situation becomes still more complex where a report of abuse or
neglect leads the state to bring formal charges of child maltreatment
against the parenting ward. In this context, a finding that the mother has
abused or neglected her child is particularly tragic. A teen, who herself
was a victim of maltreatment, faces the removal of her child on similar
grounds. In fact, separate but related cases regarding the ward and her
child may be pending at the same time, in the same courthouse, and
possibly before the same judge.3 Advocates for mothers in care must
struggle to define their roles and protect their clients' interests on this
uncertain legal terrain.
This Article examines the legal status of young mothers in foster care
in order to parse out the thorny issues surrounding the treatment of parents
accused of child maltreatment who are themselves wards of a court. All
too often, judges, social workers, and advocates abdicate their
responsibilities to the adolescents in their care the moment those teens
become respondent parents. In part, this abdication is the result of a
profound confusion about how to balance the competing interests of the
foster child and the infant. This lack of understanding tips the balance
against the young parent and robs her of the protections her status might
otherwise afford.
In Part II of this Article, we examine the demographics of pregnant and
parenting wards in the United States and conclude that the group
represents a significant portion of foster youth. For actors in the child

3. For example, one case may be pending against the minor parent for the abuse or neglect
of the infant, and another against the teen's parent for abuse or neglect of the teen.
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welfare system to treat young parents fairly, we must understand their
rights and responsibilities under law. Thus, Part 1I examines federal and
state laws concerning the status of parenting wards. It begins with a
discussion of federal law and policies. First, it addresses constitutional
jurisprudence regarding the rights of parents to control the care and
custody of their children. These constitutional protections apply to all
parents, regardless of age, and form the bedrock on which teen parents
must stake their claims to their children.
Part III also discusses the federal funding streams for state foster care
systems. States which draw down dollars from these streams must comply
with federal rules in running their foster care systems, several of which
bear directly on the treatment of pregnant and parenting wards. The Article
then turns to state law. Since a survey of law and practice in all fifty states
is beyond the scope of this project, the Article focuses on the law and
jurisprudence of the four states with the largest number of children in care:
California, New York, Illinois, and Florida. Together, these states present
a diverse picture of foster care practices. They loosely represent the
Northeast, West, South, and Midwest; Illinois and Florida have state-run
child protective systems, whereas New York and California's child
protective systems are, for the most part, county-run.
Part IV examines the practical and ethical issues that arise when foster
youth return to court as respondent parents. It begins by addressing the
role of the court in concurrent cases, that is, those instances where a
particular young parent is involved in two simultaneous child protective
cases - one as subject child and another as respondent parent. In
proceedings which pit the rights of the parenting ward directly against
those of her infant, how can the court maintain its duty to promote the best
interests of each? In responding to that question, we examine the
implications of assigning concurrent cases to the same or to different
judges. We also examine contemporary theories of the role of the family
court, including the unified family court movement and the notion of
therapeutic jurisprudence. We next turn to the parenting ward's right to
counsel and the role of that counsel. We ask whether there is a conflict of
interest when the same lawyer represents the parenting ward both in her
case as a neglected child and in her case as a respondent parent,
concluding that the existence of such a conflict depends on the model of
representation adopted. Like the role of the family court, the role of the
child protective agency is also put into question in concurrent cases. We
next examine this role to determine if and when it is appropriate for an
agency charged with protecting a parenting ward to prosecute that ward for
child maltreatment.
Finally, Part V examines best practices for courts, agencies, and
advocates working with pregnant and parenting wards. This section covers
practices in seven areas: joint placement, parenting skills, childcare,
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education, family planning, services for fathers in care, and discharge
planning. The Article concludes with a brief examination of why the issue
of parenting wards has been so overlooked by advocates, scholars, and
child welfare administration.
II. DEMOGRAPHICS FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING WARDS

Nationwide, there are 523,085 children and youth in foster care.' Of
these children, approximately half are 11 or older.' Of the majority of
children and youth in foster care, 39% are non-Hispanic white, 35% are
African-American, and 17% are Hispanic. A disproportionate number of
foster youth are children of color.6 In fiscal year 2003, of the 281,000
children that left foster care, a majority (55%) were reunified with a parent
or primary caretaker, and 18% were adopted.7 Generally, only young
children tend to get adopted from foster care, at an average age of 6 to 7
years old.8 About one-fifth of the 100,000 youth in foster care who are 16
years or older become legally emancipated each year. 9
Little data is available on the number and demographics of pregnant
and parenting wards. Although the federal government collects and
publishes extensive data on children in the foster care system, that data
does not include information on this crucial subclass.' 1 Of the four states
surveyed, only Illinois collects information on the number of pregnant and
parenting youth in its care. " As of July 29, 2004, the latest date for which

4. See ADMIN. OF CHILDREN & FAMILY, HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., THE REPORT (data for
fiscal year ending Sept. 30, 2003), available at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/stats_
research/afcars/tar/report 10.htrn (last visited Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter AFCARS REPORT].
5. Id.
6. Id.; Casey Family Programs, Disproportionality, at http://www.casey.org/MediaCenter/
Mediakit/DisproportionalityBackgrounder.htm.
7. AFCARS REPORT, supra note 4.
8. Id.
9. Casey Family Programs, Child Welfare Fact Sheet: Statistics Illustrating Major Trends
and Issues in the Child Welfare System, at http://www.casey.org/MediaCenter/MediaKit/
FactSheet.htm.
10. For example, the primary federal tabulation of information on foster youth, the AFCARS
Report, does not include any information on the incidence of pregnancy or childbirth among foster
youth. Pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, the authors made a request to the Children's
Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services seeking information regarding the
number of pregnant and parenting youth in substitute care. The Bureau responded that it did not
have the information requested. The authors' request and the government's response are on file
with the authors.
11. Pursuant to the relevant Freedom of Information Laws, the authors wrote to all four of
the survey states requesting information regarding the number of pregnant and parenting youth in
their care. California responded that it did not collect such information. Despite repeated requests,
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Illinois provided data, the state identified 1,306 pregnant and parenting
foster youth in the state, constituting approximately 7% of the state's
foster care population.' 2
A recent survey in New York City found a higher rate of parenting
among foster youth. The report, produced by the New York City Public
Advocate's Office, found that about one in every six girls in New York
City foster care is either pregnant or a parent. 13 The report noted that this
estimate is probably artificially low, as the survey relied on voluntary
responses from foster care agencies throughout the city. Since many of the
agencies failed to14 respond, the survey data accounted for only 40% of the
children in care.
The available data demonstrates not just that a significant number of
foster youth are pregnant and parenting, but that the incidence of
pregnancy and parenthood is higher among foster youth than among their
peers. For example, a national study found that the rate of teen parenthood
for girls in foster care was 17.2% as compared with 8.2% for girls outside
of the system."5 Studies of youth who have aged out of the foster system
have also found disproportionately high rates of pregnancy and parenting
among foster care alumni. For example, one recent study of youth leaving
foster care systems in the Midwest found that one-third of the girls had
been pregnant by age 17 and nearly half had been pregnant by age 19.6
These girls - and their male counterparts - were more than twice as
likely to have at least one child when compared with 19-year-

New York and Florida failed to provide any response whatsoever. Only Illinois furnished a written
response, including a redacted list of all pregnant and parenting youth known to the Illinois
Department of Children and Family Services on five separate dates: July 29, 2004, February 14,
2003, September 18, 2002, November 15, 2001, and November 30, 2000. All requests and
responses are on file with the authors.
12. To determine that there were 1,306 pregnant and parenting youth in foster care on July
29, 2004, the authors counted the entries on the redacted list of such youth provided by Illinois
DCFS.
13. Jill E. Sheppard & Mark A. Woltman, The Public Advocate for the City of New York,
Children Raising Children: City Fails to Adequately Assist Pregnant and Parenting Youth in Foster
Care (May 2005) available at http://pubadvocate.nyc.gov/policy/documents/FosterCareSurvey
ReportFinal.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
14. See id.
15. Peter J. Pecorca et al., Assessing the Effects of Foster Care: Early Results from the Casey
National Alumni Study 23 (2003), availableat http://www.casey.org/NR/rdonlyres/CEFBB 1B67ED1-440D-925A-E5BAF602294D/302/caseyalumni studiesreport.pdf (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
16. Mark E. Courtney et al., Midwest Evaluation of the Adult Functioning of Former Foster
Youth: Outcomes at Age 19, at 52-54 (May 2005), availableat http://www.chapinhall.org/article_
abstract.aspx?ar=1355 (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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olds who had never been in foster care.' 7 A study in Utah similarly found
that among former foster youth ages 18 to 24, the birth rate was nearly
three times the rate for 18 to 24-year-old women in the general Utah
population. 18
While the existing evidence clearly indicates that there is a high
incidence of pregnancy and parenting among foster youth, the population's
importance is far greater than its numbers. Parenting wards present a
crucial point of intervention in the foster care cycle. Failure to meet the
needs of this population places both the foster youth and their children at
increased risk of homelessness and poverty,'9 and sets the stage for yet
another generation of children to be removed from their parents and raised
by the state.
III. SURVEY OF LAWS AND POLICIES

A. FederalLaws Governing ParentingWards
Laws regarding the rights and obligations of children and parents, as
well as laws providing for the care and protection of children, vary widely
from state to state. For the most part, these laws are determined by state
legislatures and local tribunals. Nevertheless, there are two sources of
federal law that merit examination. First, there is a significant body of
federal constitutional jurisprudence that forms the basis for parents' rights
across the nation. Second, through the federal government's provision of
foster care funds to the various states, Congress has imposed regulations
regarding the treatment of parents and foster children on all participating
states. This section discusses each body of federal law, with a focus on its
significance for pregnant and parenting wards.

17. Id. at 55-57.
18. Lois Thiessen Love et al., Fostering Hope: Preventing Teen Pregnancy Among Youth in
Foster Care 7 (2005) availableat http://www.teenpregnancy.org/ (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
19. See infra Part V.G.
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1. Constitutional Jurisprudence Regarding Parents' Rights
A parent's right to raise her child,2" and to do so in the manner she sees
fit, is among the strongest rights implied from the substantive due process
clause as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment of the
Constitution.2 Beginning in the 1920s, the U.S. Supreme Court developed
a jurisprudence guaranteeing parents the right to make choices central to
their children's upbringing and welfare, including choosing foreign
language instruction,22 selecting nonpublic education for their children,23
and educating their children outside of state-approved schools. 24 Time and
again, the Supreme Court has affirmed the primary role of parental rights
in our culture.25
The Supreme Court most recently reiterated the constitutional basis of
parental rights in Troxel v. Granville.26 Troxel involved a challenge to the
application of a Washington statute that provided that "any person may
petition the court for visitation rights at any time including, but not limited
to, custody proceedings., 27 In Troxel, paternal grandparents brought suit
in Washington Superior Court for increased visitation with their two
granddaughters after the death of Brad Troxel, their son and the girls'

20. We use the term "parents," but we are mostly discussing mothers in this article. The
rights for biological mothers and fathers are quite different. Under federal constitutional
jurisprudence, "unwed fathers" must take some step beyond biological parenting, such as holding
themselves out as the father, being on the child's birth certificate, or paying support, in order to
merit full notice and due process before losing physical and/or legal custody of their children. See,
e.g., Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983) (refusing to grant a right to notice or an opportunity
to be heard in his child's termination and adoption proceedings to a father who had not lived with
nor financially supported his daughter and did not register as the putative father, though he had
visited her); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380, 392-94 (1979). But see Stanley v. Illinois, 405
U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a law presuming unwed fathers are unfit parents
without an individual hearing). Although biological parents have been given priority over other
kinds of parents, the U.S. Supreme Court has diminished the importance of biological fathers by
according parental rights to a husband over a child's biological and, in part, psychological father
to uphold traditional relationships such as marriage. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110
(1989).
21. For an explication of the underpinnings of parental rights or "family integrity" rights, see,
e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
22. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
23. See Pierce v. Soc'y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
24. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
25. Id.at 232 ("Th[e] primary role of the parents in the upbringing of their children is now
established beyond debate as an enduring American tradition.").
26. 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
27. Id. at 58.
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father. Over the objection of Tommie Granville, the girls' mother, the trial
judge ordered visitation far in excess of the amount of visitation the
mother had previously allowed. The girls' mother appealed the decision,
which eventually made its way to the Supreme Court. The Court held, six
to three, that the application of the Washington statute to the case at hand
had violated Tommie Granville's right under the Fourteenth Amendment
to make decisions "concerning the rearing of her own daughters."28
The Troxel Court was not unanimous, and even the plurality disagreed
about the appropriate standard of review for laws bearing on a parent's
right to raise her children.29 Nevertheless, Troxel stands as a resounding
affirmation of that right. Under the plurality's balancing test, "so long as
a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is fit), there will
normally be no reason for the State to inject itself into the private realm of
the family to further question the ability of that parent to make the best
decisions concerning the rearing of that parent's children."3 ° All of the
justices joining the plurality, and indeed some of the dissenters, affirm the
Court's long-standingjurisprudence which finds in the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment the right of "the custodial parent .... to
determine, without undue interference by the state, how best to raise,
nurture, and educate the child."'" Subsequently, courts around the country,
including the courts of the states surveyed here, have cited Troxel for the
proposition first set forth in Meyer v. Nebraska over eighty years ago:
Parents have a fundamental right to control the care and custody of their
children.32
These strong substantive due process parental rights are protected by
a series of procedures that must be followed before a parent is found unfit
or deprived custody of his or her child. For instance, states must prove
parental unfitness in termination of parental rights cases by clear and
convincing evidence, the highest civil evidentiary standard.33 Parents,

28. Id. at 67-70.
29. Writing for the plurality, Justice O'Connor applies an intermediate-level test which
balances a parent's right to raise her children with the state's role as parenspatriaeto protect the
welfare of children. Id.at 67-73. But see id. at 80 (Thomas, J. concurring) (calling for a strict
scrutiny analysis of laws infringing on the fundamental rights of parents).
30. Id. at 68-69.
31. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 74 (Kennedy, J. dissenting).
32. See Miller v. California Dep't of Soc. Servs., 355 F. 3d 1172, 1175-76 (9th Cir. 2004);
Terry v. Richardson, 346 F. 3d 81, 784 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Nicholson, Nos. 00-2229, 00-5155
& 00-6885, 2001 WL1338834, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 24, 2001); N.S.H. v. Fla. Dep't of Children
& Family Servs., 843 So. 2d. 898, 905 (Fla. 2003).
33. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769-70 (1982) (holding that before a state may
sever a parent's rights, due process requires that the state support its allegations of parental
unfitness by at least clear and convincing evidence).
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including unwed fathers, have the right to an individual hearing on their
fitness, rather than being denied custody of their children based on a
presumption. 4 However, the Supreme Court determined that a parent's
right to a fair hearing in the termination of his or her parental rights, albeit
"commanding," does not necessarily include the right to appointed
counsel.35
2. Federal Funding Schemes for Pregnant and Parenting Wards
The federal government also plays a significant role in the child
protection arena through its provision of federal monies to various states.
Federal foster care policies directing the use of these monies reflect the
constitutional jurisprudence regarding the right of parents to control the
care and custody of their children. Title IV-E of the Social Security Act
sets up the structure for federal funding of state foster care systems,
whereby the Department of Health and Human Services reimburses state
systems for a portion of the funds they expend for care to foster children.36
Title IV-E imposes a plethora ofrequirements on states wishing to recover
a portion of their foster care costs from the federal government.37 While
compliance varies from state to state, title IV-E has established national
criteria for both dependency courts and foster care systems.
Title IV-E speaks directly to the issue of children born to parenting
wards.38 Since 1987, federal law has anticipated that infants born to youth
in foster care will remain in the physical and legal custody of their
mothers.39 Specifically, statutes and regulations provide that where an
infant is born to a teen in foster care, and the parent and child reside
together, payments made by the state for the teen's maintenance must
include an additional amount for the infant's support.4" Conversely, if the
34. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (finding unconstitutional a law that presumed
unwed fathers to be unfit parents without an individual hearing).
35. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 31-32 (1981).
36. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 670-679. Eligibility for title IV-E funds is linked to a child's eligibility
for the old Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), now known as Temporary Assistance
for Needy Families (TANF). 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(L). In the simplest terms, to receive federal title
IV-E payments, a child must have been eligible for AFDC benefits prior to entering foster care. Id.
For a summary of federal child protective programs, see 2000 Green Book, Committee on Ways
and Means, U.S. House of Representatives, § 11 (2000), availableat http://aspe.hhs.gov/2000gb/
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
37. See 42 U.S.C. § 671.
38. See 42. U.S.C. § 675(4)(B) (2005).
39. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, § 9133(b)(2).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(B) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.21(j) (2005) ("Foster care maintenance
payments made on behalf of a child.., who is the parent of a son or daughter in the same home
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state removes the infant from its mother's physical custody, the state may
not use federal foster care funds to support the infant unless the separation
is sanctioned by a court order."
Thus, an infant born to a young parent in foster care is effectively
"covered" by the foster care maintenance case of his or her parent. If the
foster child and infant remain in the same home, the state does not need to
make a separate determination of eligibility for the baby.4" In the same
vein, infants born to foster children who receive Medicaid are themselves
categorically eligible for Medicaid if they remain in the physical and legal
custody of their parents.43 Once again, the infant is covered by his or her
parent's status as a beneficiary of federal foster care funds. Finally, the
same rule applies to an infant's receipt of title XX Social Services Block
Grant funds. If the infant remains in the foster child's custody, the infant
is automatically eligible for these funds.45
The Children's Bureau, the arm of the U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services responsible for federal programs regarding foster care,
answers a question on this exact issue in its Child Welfare Policy Manual:
Section 475(4)(B) of the [Social Security] Act requires that foster
care maintenance payments for a minor parent in foster care cover
a child of such parent if the child is placed with the minor parent.
...Good

social work practice suggests that... the child's needs

and interests be addressed during the [periodic court reviews] held
on behalf of the minor parent. However, the State is not required to
satisfy these requirements independently on behalf of the child
because s/he [has not been removed from her/his biological parent]
and therefore, pursuant to Federal law and regulations, is not in
foster care.'

or institution, must include amounts which are necessary to cover costs incurred on behalf of the
child's son or daughter.").
41. See 42 U.S.C. § 675 (4)(B).
42. Id.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 672(h).
44. Id. The Social Services Block Grant (SSBG) is a program under which the federal
government disburses funds to the various states. States have considerable discretion in how to use
the funds, and states are not required to match the funds. Among other things, a state's SSBG may
be used to prevent or remedy child abuse and neglect. See 2000 Green Book, supra note 36.
45. Id.
46. ADMIN. OF CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HuM. SERV., CHILD
WELFARE POLICY MANUAL,ch. 8.3A.5 [hereinafter CHILD WELFARE POLICY MANUAL], available

at http://www.acf.hhs.gov/j2ee/programs/cb/laws/cwpm/index.j sp?idFlag=0 (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
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The Manual also explains that children born to and living with parents
in foster care are categorically eligible for Medicaid and other social
services:
Section 472(h) of the [Social Security] Act makes clear that a child
whose costs are covered by the title IV-E payment made with
respect to the minor parent is a child with respect to whom foster
care maintenance payments are made under title IV-E and is thus
eligible for
medical assistance and social services under titles XIX
47
and XX.
Congress has even spoken to the particular needs of minor parents in
foster care who are freed for adoption. To ensure that teen mothers have
the same opportunities for adoption as other foster youth, the government
will provide the adoptive family with a subsidy for the teen which also
covers the needs of her child.48 Thus, a foster family who adopts a teen
mother may receive an adoption assistance grant adjusted to meet the
needs of the teen and her baby. 49 The minor parent gains a new mother
and/or father but retains custody of her infant. The infant, in turn, remains
with his mother and gains a new grandmother and/or grandfather. Once
again, the Children's Bureau of the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services has clarified this policy in its Child Welfare Policy Manual.5"
Thus, in accordance with constitutional jurisprudence, these laws and
regulations require states receiving federal financial participation to leave
infants born to teens in foster care in the custody of their mothers. States
may be excused from this mandate solely on a case-by-case basis, wherel
either the mother has voluntarily placed her child in the state's custody
or there has been a judicial finding that it would be contrary to the infant's
welfare to remain in his or her mother's care. 2 Failure to act accordingly
jeopardizes the state's receipt of federal foster care dollars.53 The amount
of money at stake is significant; in fiscal year 2001, the federal
4
appropriation for the title IV-E program alone was $5,063,500,000.1

47. Id.
48. 2 U.S.C. § 673(a)(2)(A) (2005).
49. Id.
50. See CHILD WELFARE PoLIcY MANUAL, supra note 46, ch. 8.2B.3.
51. 42 U.S.C. § 672(e).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 672(a).
53. 45 C.F.R. § 1355.36(b),(c) (2005).
54. ADMINISTRATION FOR CHILDREN & FAMILIES, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV.,
TITLE IV-E FOSTER CARE, available at www.acf.hhs.gov/programs/cb/programs/4efc.htm (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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Beyond the threat of sanctions for noncompliance, states have several
other economic incentives to allow teens in foster care to maintain
physical custody of their children. Most importantly, by enabling foster
youth to maintain custody of their children, the state avoids the need to
place a second generation of children in foster care.55 Though it still bears
the costs of supporting the infant, the state avoids many of the secondary
costs associated with foster care placement. First, by leaving the infant in
the custody of its mother, the state avoids the financial demands of
litigating and managing a second dependency case. Second, the state saves
money by avoiding the need to find, license, and monitor an additional
foster care placement. Third, the federal scheme allows states to avoid
making complicated eligibility determinations for benefits paid on behalf
of infants in the custody of foster children. Because the eligibility criteria
for federal foster care payments are complicated and arcane, this
represents a significant gain in efficiency.
Finally, states which forcibly remove an infant from a minor parent
without good cause face suit for violating the mother's and the infant's
constitutional procedural due process rights. Reflecting the reciprocal
nature of the right to family integrity, plaintiffs in such actions include
both the foster child and her child or children. In one case, New York City
unlawfully separated a foster child and her twin sons for almost two
years.56 The young mother brought suit under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act. The suit named as defendants both the City and Lakeside
Children's and Family Services, the nonprofit agency which had
contracted with the City for her care.57 The suit settled for approximately
$250,000.58 In a similar case, the City separated a foster child and her baby
after the foster mother who was housing them admitted to hitting and
shaking the baby. 9 The mother and her child were separated for
approximately four months.6" The teen mother sued the City and the foster
care agency, Harlem Dowling.6 The case settled for $525,000, with the
City paying $200,000 and Harlem Dowling paying $325,000.62

55. For a portrait of two generations raised in foster care, see NINA BERNSTEIN, THE LOST
(2001).
56. Fraser v. Scoppetta (03 CV 2815) (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 23, 2003) (on file with authors).
57. Id.
58. Id. Settlement on file with Plantiffs' counsel, Lansner and Fubitschek.
59. Rosado v. Bligen, 98 CV 6420 (S.D.N.Y. 1998). Pleadings on file with the Plaintiffs'
counsel, Lansner & Kubitschek.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
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Despite the myriad economic incentives to allow foster children to
maintain custody of their infants, states have been slow to adopt this
policy. There is widespread ignorance about both the federal policies and
the constitutional rights of young parents, even among their advocates. In
just one example, a report published by the University of North Carolina
on pregnant and parenting adolescents, including those in foster care,
misstates title IV-E policy regarding parenting wards and fails to
acknowledge that parenting wards and their children have a legal right to
reside together.63 In fact, at the local level, advocates report that there is
relatively little compliance with either the spirit or the letter of federal law
and regulation.' To understand why federal policy has not resulted in
more consistent protection of the minor parent and infant's reciprocal right
to live as a family, we move to an examination of the four survey states.
B. State Laws Regarding the Status of Minor Parents
Before focusing on the situation of parenting wards, it is helpful to
review laws regarding minor parents in general. Despite variation, the laws
of the four survey states reflect the same conundrum: Minor parents have
the rights of other parents with regards to their children, yet in most other
aspects retain the legal incapacity imposed by their age. All four survey
states set the age of majority at eighteen,65 and in no state does pregnancy
or parenthood cure a minor's incapacity. Unlike pregnancy or parenthood,
marriage emancipates a minor.66 However, in none of the four states may

63. ANNE DELLINGER, INSTITUTE OF GOVERNMENT, UNIVERSITY OF NORTH CAROLINA,
SOCIAL SERVICES FOR PREGNANT AND PARENTING ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 56-59 (July

2002), availableat http://www.adolescentpregnancy.unc.edu/pdf/appbook2.pdf (last visited Mar.
28, 2006). The report erroneously suggests that the state may be reimbursed for an infant placed
separately from the parenting ward even when such removal is not made pursuant to court order.
Id. at 57. It implies that the state may take custody of a ward's child simply because foster parents
"may be more comfortable" caring for the mother and child if they are both in state custody. Id. at
58. Finally, it notes, absent any critique, that "some DSS attorneys and staff in North Carolina
report that their agency always asks the court for custody of both children, on the theory that the
younger child is dependent because her custodial parent is." Id. at 58.
64. See, e.g., YOUTH ADVOCACY CENTER, CARING FOR OUR CHILDREN: IMPROVING THE
FOSTER CARE SYSTEM FOR TEEN MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN 25-29 (1995) (documenting the

wide-spread illegal separation of foster youth from their new babies).
65. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 6500-6502 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ch. 743.07 (2005); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/11-1 (2005); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 1-202 (McKinney 2005).
66. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 7002 (West 2005).
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a minor marry without parental or judicial approval.67 Thus the key to the
minor's emancipation is in the hands of adult authorities.
In contrast, with regard to her child, a minor may act as an adult.6" For
example, no state requires that a minor have parental permission to deliver
or keep a child, and in all four states a minor may surrender her child for
adoption without parental consent.69 Rules regarding medical consent also
follow this pattern. In Florida, a pregnant minor may consent to medical
care relating to her pregnancy and to medical or surgical care for her
child,7 ° but not for her own surgical care. Of the four survey states, Illinois
is the only state that has resolved this incongruity by granting pregnant and
parenting teens the right to consent not just to their children's medical care
but to their own medical care as well, 1 whether or not it is related to the
pregnancy. 72 For the most part, however, state laws reflect the tension
embodied by the legal status of the minor parent.
C. State Laws Regarding the Status of ParentingWards
The double standard whereby minor parents are adults for
pregnancy and parenting purposes, yet children for other purposes - is
reflected in the policies regarding parenting wards in the four survey
states. These policies are discussed in detail below.
1. New York
Of the four states surveyed, New York is the only state with written
policies that clearly comply with the federal rules regarding parenting
wards. In 1993, New York State's Department of Social Services
promulgated regulations providing that title IV-E eligible foster children
who are minor parents, and the children of such minor parents, are eligible
for federally reimbursable foster care maintenance payments, as long as

67. CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 302-303 (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ch. 741.0405 (2005); 755 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/203, 208 (2005); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 14-a(2) (McKinney 2005).
68. To some extent, abortion is an exception to the general rule that minors are treated as
adults for the purposes of pregnancy. In three out of the four survey states - Florida, Illinois, and
California - the legislature has passed laws requiring parental notification and/or consent for a
minor to obtain an abortion. However, in all three states, the laws were blocked by court action, and
are currently not in effect. See Heather Boonstra & Elizabeth Nash, Minors and the Right to
Consent to Health Care, in THE GUTTENMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY 6-7 (Aug. 2000).
69. CAL. FAM. CODE § 8700(b) (West 2005); FLA. STAT. ch. 63.085 (2005); 750 ILL. COMP.

STAT. 50/11 (a) (2005). But see § 63.082(l)(g) (requiring that a parent or a guardian ad litem must
witness the consent to adoption when the relinquishing parent is fourteen years old or younger);
N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111 (McKinney 2005).
70. FLA. STAT. ch. 743.065 (2005).
71. 410 ILL. COMP. STAT. 210/2 (2004).
72. Id.
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parent and child both reside together in the same foster family home or
residential facility and the child is not in the care and custody of the local
commissioner of social services. 73 This regulation directly tracks the
federal foster care policies discussed above.
Similarly, New York State's Adoption Assistance and Medicaid rules
for parentinf wards parallel those promulgated by the federal
government. As provided for by federal regulation, the children of
parenting wards in New York are covered by their mothers' title IV-E
foster care case; as long as the parenting ward is eligible for adoption
assistance and/or Medicaid, the infant in her care is presumptively eligible
as well. 76 Finally, minor parents in New York foster care are specifically
eligible for preventive services aimed at keeping families intact."
In 1994, a year after the above regulations took effect, the New York
Department of Social Services disseminated an Administrative Directive
summarizing the Department's new policies regarding pregnant and
parenting wards. 7' The Directive goes beyond the scope of the regulations,
setting a clear policy respecting the rights of parenting wards to assume
and retain custody of their children. The Directive states that:
[W]hen it is necessary to place a minor parent in foster care and a
decision is made that it would be in the best interests of both the
minor parent and his or her child to be together... custody of the
minor parent's child should remain with the minor parent. The
same rule should be applied if a foster child gives birth while in
foster care.7 9
Moreover, the Directive clarifies that when the state contemplates forcibly
removing a child from a parent's care, the same legal criteria must be met
whether that parent is a foster child or not. ° Thus, the Directive complies
with federal constitutional jurisprudence in recognizing the fundamental

73. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 426.3(i) (2005).
74. See supra Part III.A.2.
75. See supra Part III.A.2.
76. N.Y. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, §§ 426.5(b), 426.7.
77. N.Y. CODES R.&REGS. tit. 18, § 423.4(g)(2). Such services include individual and group
activities to meet case planning goals, day care, homemaker services, housekeeping assistance,
transportation, and housing. For the enumerated list of services, see N.Y. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18,
§ 423.2(b).
78. Admin. Directive 94 ADM-12, N.Y. Dep't of Soc. Serv. (July 7, 1994) [hereinafter 94
ADM- 12], availableat http://www.otda.state.ny.US/directives/1994/ADM/94_ADM- 12.pdf (last
visited Mar. 28, 2006).
79. Id. at 3.
80. Id.
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right of every parent to the custody, care, and control of her children. 8
"Factors such as the minor parent's age, previous history, perceived
abilities, etc. should never be the sole criteria for taking legal custody of
the child of a minor parent in foster care."82
In New York, the new regulations promulgated in 1993 prompted
litigation to determine their impact on minor parents in foster care and the
concomitant obligations of the local child protective agencies. Courts,
including the New York Court of Appeals, interpreted the regulations as
allowing greater custodial rights to minor parent wards, since they were no
longer required to place their children in foster care to receive financial
support and services for their care. In the first such case, in 1994, a New
York City Family Court found that the new regulations allowed a baby
born to a minor ward to be supported by the state child welfare agency
without removing the baby from his or her parent.8 3 Once again, this result
comported with the constitutional rights framework outlined above.' 4 As
the family court wrote, "[t]he Commissioner, the [minor] mother, and the
baby have the right to have the baby out of foster care." 5 Based on this
finding, the Court permitted the agency to withdraw its petition for
voluntary placement of the infant.86 The family court distinguished the
new system from the prior one, wherein minor parent wards had to sign
sham voluntary placement agreements as the "door to receiving support"
for their children and family court judges had to declare the "'agreement'
valid largely because the young mother had no real choice; she could not
care for the baby [financially]."
The case was subsequently affirmed by the First Department of the89
New York Appellate Division, and the New York Court of Appeals.

81. See supra Part III.A. 1.
82. 94 ADM-12, supra note 78, at 4.
83. See In re Matter of C., 607 N.Y.S.2d 1014 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1994). Although this decision
expands the rights of and resources for minor ward parents, the authors were shocked by the court's
dicta stating that "[s]erious consideration must be given by the Commissioner to the need for
educating children in foster care.., to the wide range of population prevention methods including
sterilization." Id. at 1017.
84. See supra Part III.A. I.
85. 607N.Y.S.2dat 1016.
86. Id. at 1015.
87. Id. at 1016.
88. In re Tyriek W., 613 N.Y.S.2d 146, 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (finding that the
regulations allow minor parent wards to get support for their children without going through
the"fiction" of voluntary placements and thus are able to "achieve the desirable and worthy goal
of keeping the[ir] children out of foster care.").
89. See In re Tyriek W., 652 N.E.2d 168 (N.Y. 1995).
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The Court of Appeals confirmed that the new regulations required the
counties to treat children born to wards and their parents as "family units,"
in which the infants were presumptively in the sound custody of their
parents and hence beyond the jurisdiction of the family court.9" The Court
found that children born to minor parent wards are entitled to a full range
of services, such as financial support, case management, and preventive
services, but are not themselves "foster children."'" In reaching this
decision, the Court looked to the primary goal of the statute authorizing
foster care review - to achieve permanency for children.92 The Court
concluded that children living with their parents, whether or not the
parents were in foster care, had permanency already, rendering judicial
review unnecessary. 93 The Court rejected the argument put forth by
children's rights groups that children born to minor parents are inherently
"at-risk" and reiterated the principle of individual rights underlying abuse
and neglect cases.94 Like any other parent, a parenting ward in New York
has the right to make independent decisions regarding her child's
upbringing. Where the child protective agency is concerned that those
decisions are placing her child at risk of harm, the agency may file a
petition and seek to place the infant under the protection of the court. 95
2. California
California law arguably is not in compliance with the title IV-E
funding requirements discussed above. California currently pays less to
foster parents for the care of a ward and her baby than for two similarlyaged, but unrelated, foster children. 96 Under this scheme, when a foster
youth and her child are placed together, the foster care placement receives
a full foster care grant for the ward, plus a small "infant supplement" for

90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See id.
at 170-71.
Id.at 170.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Tyriek, 652 N.E.2d at 171.

96. CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., ONLINE MANUALOFPOLICYAND PROCEDURES, Div. 11-415.1

[hereinafter CAL. ONLINE MANUAL] (providing that the supplement for an infant residing with a
minor parent who receives title IV-E foster care funds shall be $768/month if the minor parent
resides in a group home, or $354/month if the minor parent is in any other type of placement),
availableat http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/ord/CDSSManual 240.htm; CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV.,
ELIGIBILITY AND ASSISTANCE, Div. 45-200.2, 45-302. 211, available at http://www.dss.cahwnet.

gov/ord/CDSSManual_240.htm (last visited Mar. 28,2006); CAL. DEP'T Soc. SERVS., ALLCOuNTY
LETrER 88-153 (Dec. 2, 1988).
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the baby. This violates title IV-E funding rules, which require that foster
care payments made to parenting wards "must include amounts which are
necessary to cover costs incurred on behalf of the child's son or
daughter."97 The "infant supplement" clearly does not meet that standard,
as it is less than the basic foster care rate that the State of California has
determined is necessary to support a child of that age.
California's lower payment rate for children born to youth in foster
care applies whenever the ward and her child are placed together.98 Thus,
there is a disincentive for foster parents or congregate care facilities to
serve minor parents and their children, resulting in a shortage of foster
care placements for minor parents. California recently adopted the Teen
Parents in Foster Care Act, legislation designed to address the unique
issues facing teen parents in foster care. The Teen Parents in Foster Care
Act does not propose to change the current infant supplement99 but rather
includes legislative findings that the supplement limits the supply of foster
care placements for mothers and children, thus hurting this population:
(d) The current infant supplemental payment rate paid to a foster
parent who provides care for both a minor dependent parent and
infant, which is designed to provide for the costs of infant care,
such as transportation, food, shelter, clothing, and equipment,
including diapers and car seats, as well as the costs of mentoring
the foster child who is the infant's parent and assisting them to
develop parenting skills, is less than the basic AFDC-FC rate for an
infant placed into foster care and is not commensurate with the
rising costs of infant care. Further, the low rate serves as a
disincentive in recruiting and retaining trained foster care providers
who are willing to care for both a dependent minor parent and
infant, and who are skilled in providing the mentoring services and
role modeling that these dependent minor parents need in order to
become successful parents. Finally, the resulting shortage in
qualified foster care providers can cause teen parents and their
babies to be separated, disrupting the parent-child bond and
potentially severing family ties. °
Although the new law does not correct the inequality in reimbursement
rates for parenting wards, the law encourages state and local child welfare
agencies to collect data to develop a rate structure that better compensates
97. 42 U.S.C. § 675(4)(B) (2005); 45 C.F.R. § 1356.210) (2005).
98. CAL. ONLINE MANUAL, supra note 96, Div. 11-415-1.
99. Although this is a long term goal of advocates, they felt that including a rate increase in
the bill would preclude its passage.
100. S.B. 1178, ch. 841, § 2(b)-(c).
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foster parents who will care for minor parents, thus expanding this group
of caregivers.' 0 '
Also, the bill mandates that foster homes and congregate care facilities
for teen parents "demonstrate a willingness and ability to provide [them
with] support and assistance."' 02 Agencies must, "[t]o the greatest extent
possible," identify and use "whole family placements" and other
placements that will support the teen parent and her children, including
developing model programs specifically for this population." 3
The Teen Parents in Foster Care Act makes other important findings
about minor parents in foster care and their children, and mandates that
they receive certain services and placements. This portion of the bill has
the most "teeth." It specifies that agencies and courts must attempt to place
the minor parent and child together in as family-like a setting as possible:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this act to preserve the
continuity of the family unit and ensure the maintenance and
strengthening of family relationships between a dependent minor
parent and his or her child by ensuring that the courts and
responsible agencies shall, whenever possible, protect the best
interests of a dependent minor parent and his or her child as a unit,
and shallmake diligent and active efforts to maintain relationships
between minor parents and their children, including, but not limited
to, placement of the minor parent and the child together in as
family-like a setting as possible.1
Finally, the new legislation requires agencies to provide parenting
wards with services for which they are eligible, such as childcare and
parenting classes.0 5 The statute clarifies that the minor parent must be
given the ability to attend school, do her homework, and participate in
"ordinary" teenage activities "unrelated to and separate from parenting."l°6
Where the state does gain custody of the infant, the law mandates frequent
visitation between the mother and the child as well as contact between the
infant and the non-custodial parent, when such contact is in the infant's
best interest.'0 7

101. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16004.5(2), (d) (2005).

102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

CAL.
CAL.
S.B.
Id.
CAL.
CAL.

WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002.5(C) (2005).
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16004.5(b) (2005).
1178 ch. 841, § 2(e) (emphasis added).
WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002.5(b) (2005).

WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002.5(a),(d) (2005).
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In addition to the statewide legislation, Los Angeles County has
adopted its own policies for parenting teens in foster care.' Policy and
practice in Los Angeles merit independent examination. Not only is Los
Angeles County the largest county in California, it runs the single largest
county-based child welfare system in the United States, with responsibility
for over 30,000 foster children, approximately 9,000 of whom are fifteen
or older.1 °9 The Los Angeles Child Welfare Services (CWS) Policy
Handbook sets forth specific placement and service policies, and makes
clear the agency's responsibility to provide supportive services for teens
in foster care who become parents, including locating a school with
childcare, and
0 referring non-custodial fathers to appropriate community
programs."l
The Policy Handbook clarifies that "the fact that a teen [dependent] has
a child is not in itself reason for our Department to intervene on behalf of
the infant."'" Nonetheless, it singles these teens out for heightened review
of their parenting abilities: "Anytime a teen receiving services from our
Department becomes a parent, the ability of the teen to care for the infant
must be assessed." ' 2 Moreover, its assessment regarding the necessity of
intervention with respect to the infant does not discuss the pertinent legal
standards for abuse or neglect, but rather discusses "the teen's ability to
care for the infant" and "the teen's family's attitude toward the infant and
... ability/willingness to provide assistance to the teen."' 3 This language
reflects a possible disregard for the constitutional rights of all parents to
the same process and standard for removal. However, the policy does
mandate that caseworkers consider whether the use of community
resources and "voluntary services" might allow the young family to stay
together without court supervision." 4
3. Illinois
In contrast to New York and California, the policy in Illinois regarding
parenting wards was developed in response to litigation by advocates. In

108. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Serv. Policy Manual 0600-507.11, (issued Sept. 20, 2001); Cal. Dep't
of Soc. Serv. Policy Manual 0600-507.10 (issued Oct. 31, 2001).
109. CAL. DEP'T OF SOC. SERV., CHARACTERISTICS OF CHILDREN IN OUT-OF-HOME CARE,
availableat http://www.dss.cahwnet.gov/research/CWS-CMS2-C_412.htm (last visited Mar. 28,
2006). California reports that there were 33,017 children in foster care in Los Angeles County on
December 31, 2003, the last date for which information is available. Id.
110. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Serv. Policy Manual 0600-507.10 at 1,5-6; see also Cal. Dep't of Soc.
Serv. Policy Manual 0600-507.11, at 5.
111. Cal. Dep't of Soc. Serv. Policy Manual 0600-507.10 at 1.
112. Id.
113. Id.at 5.
114. Id.at 6-7.
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1988, a parenting ward in the custody of the Illinois Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) filed a writ of habeas corpus to
regain physical custody of her child. 5 She alleged that DCFS had
improperly separated her from her child by placing them in separate
facilities." 6 After the court granted her requested relief, plaintiff's counsel
amended the original complaint to state a class action on behalf of all
pregnant and parenting minors in the care of DCFS.' 7 In Hill v. Erickson,
the plaintiffs alleged that DCFS, along with the Illinois Department of
Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities (DMHDD), inappropriately
placed them in shelters, mental health facilities, and other temporary
settings, separating them from their children." 8 The plaintiffs further
alleged that DCFS failed to provide them with appropriate treatment and
services for adolescent or expectant parents.119 The plaintiffs claimed that
these policies and practices violated their federal and state statutory and
constitutional rights.' 20
The suit was settled by the entry of a Consent Decree in 1994, which
remains in effect.' 2 ' Under the Decree, wards in Illinois have the right to
assume and retain custody of their children.' 22 Parenting wards must be
placed with their children unless separate placement is necessary for the
safety of the child, and separation is permissible only with prior or
subsequent court approval. 23
' The Decree vests parenting wards in Illinois
with the right to education, day care for their children, access to family
planning information, and transportation to school and medical
appointments. 2 4 The Decree also gives parenting wards the right to
receive shelter, food, clothing, and other services from DCFS until the
ward turns twenty-one.' 25 DCFS subsequently
codified many of these
26
rights in the Illinois Administrative Code.
The Consent Decree and subsequent regulations protect parenting
wards not just from the arbitrary or retaliatory removal of their children,

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
Illinois),
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Hill v. Erickson, No. 88 CO 296 (Circuit Court of Cook County, Illinois).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Hill, No. 88 CO at 296.
Consent Decree, Hill v. Erickson, No. 88 CO 296 (Circuit Court of Cook County,
entered Jan. 3, 1994 (on file with the authors).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 302, app. J (1996).
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but also from arbitrary or retaliatory threats of removal. The Illinois
regulations state that:
Pregnant and parenting teens shall not be threatened with release
from DCFS custody or guardianship, with termination of their
parental rights ... or with false reports of abuse or neglect ... in

order to coerce the ward into cooperating with the ward's
placement or service plan or to punish the ward for
complaining
27
about the quality of her/his placement or services. 1
This addresses a problem noted by advocates for parenting wards in all of
the survey states - threats by foster care staff to remove a parenting
ward's child if the parenting ward fails to follow program rules or the
ward's service plan, even though the ward's behavior clearly does
not rise
1 28
to the level of abuse or neglect as defined by relevant state law.
The need for such a proscription against coercive threats of removal
reflects the power that DCFS and agency employees have over the lives
of young parents in care, as well as the vulnerability of those young
parents. Such threats are a clear abuse of power. A parenting ward
commonly has little family beyond her children. The possibility that her
child will relive her fate may be particularly devastating. The
pervasiveness of such threats also reflects the foster care system's
readiness to switch alliances as a ward reaches adolescence. Now that she
has a child, the same system that cast the ward as a helpless victim is quick
to cast her as the enemy. The Consent Decree in Hill v. Erickson
recognizes this pattern and attempts to disrupt it, by insisting that wards
do not forfeit their right to support and protection upon becoming parents.
While Illinois has the most comprehensive and favorable policies in
place for the care of parenting wards, actual practice does not always
reflect those policies. Pursuant to the Consent Decree, the state keeps
statistics regarding the plaintiff class. Pregnant and parenting wards who
reside in Cook County and the "collar counties" - that is, Chicago and
the neighboring areas - are served by the Teen Parenting Service
Network (TPSN), which publishes an annual report. 2 9 These reports show
mixed results. Since 1999, the first year the program was implemented,
TPSN has increased the number of fathering wards receiving services,
transferred many pregnant and parenting teens to more appropriate

127. Id. at (2).
128. For example, the ward's returning home, with her child, thirty minutes after curfew.
129. Teen Parenting Service Network, Uhlich Children's Home, TPSN Year in Review, FY
1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 & 2003 [hereinafter TPSN] (on file with authors).
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placements, located many runaway clients, and provided caseworkers with
targeted training on working with parenting wards. 3 0
However, TPSN has consistently failed to meet its goals regarding
education, stability, and family unity. In fiscal year 2003, only 42.7% of
pregnant and parenting wards obtained a high school diploma or GED
prior to exiting the system, a decrease from the previous year.'31 In fiscal
year 2002, over half of pregnant and parenting teens lived in more than
one foster placement, and 40% experienced at least one change in the
caseworker assigned to them. 32 Most disturbingly, over the five years of
the program, the number of pregnant and parenting teens has decreased,
while the number of infants removed from their care has increased. 33 Five
percent of parents in the program had their children removed during FY
2002, an increase from the previous year.3 4 Finally, TPSN only serves
parenting wards in Chicago and outlying areas. Almost no information is
available regarding the well-being of pregnant and parenting wards in the
"downstate" counties, who comprise about 30% of the pregnant and
parenting wards in the state. 3 While the available data suggest that
pregnant and parenting wards in Illinois are not getting all of the services
they need, it is impossible to compare Illinois's performance with that of
the other survey states, because Illinois is the only state to keep such
statistics.
4. Florida
Florida's policy regarding parenting youth in foster care does not seem
to comply with rules regarding state use of federal IV-E funds. 136 The
Florida Department of Children and Families (DCF) does recognize that
"the needs of the child living with a minor parent in the same licensed
foster home" may be "included in the Title IV-E payment being made on
behalf of the minor parent."' 37 Nevertheless, the policy violates IV-E rules

130. Id. FY 2003.
131. Id.FY 2003, at 5.
132. Id. FY 2002, at 5.
133. Id. at 1.
134. TPSN, supra note 129, FY 2002, at 5.
135. TPSN reports that it served 985 pregnant and parenting wards in 2003, while records
produced by DCFS indicate that there were 1411 pregnant and parenting wards in Illinois during
the same year. Id. FY 2003 (records listing all pregnant and parenting wards in Illinois) (on file
with authors). Thus, TPSN served an estimated 70% of Illinois's pregnant and parenting foster
youth in 2003. TPSN Year in Review FY 2003; Response to authors' FOIA request (on file with
authors).
136. Supra Part III.A.2.
137. Operating Procedure No. 175-71, Section 3-11, Fl. Dept. of Children and Families, (Sept.
6, 2005).
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to the extent that it leaves payment for such needs up to the discretion of
the counties. DCF also fails to specify how the amount necessary to cover
the needs of the foster child's infant is to be calculated, inviting counties
to provide parenting wards and their caregivers with a "supplement" or
"enhancement" which is patently insufficient to meet the infant's needs. 138
Florida policy does, however, provide that the children of parenting
wards
39
are eligible for Medicaid to the same extent as their parents.
Unfortunately, advocates in Florida report that DCF regularly violates
the rights of parenting wards to raise their children. 40 Advocates also note
that the state has a pattern of removing the children of teen wards just as
the teen is about to "age out" of the foster care system at age eighteen.'41
Such removals are sometimes triggered by accusations of abuse or neglect
by foster parents, who may wish to retain custody of the baby after the
teen ward ages out. In some cases, DCF illegally seeks to remove children
from former foster youth who have become destitute after being
discharged from care.' DCF policy implicitly encourages discrimination
against parenting wards, as it mandates that protective workers consider
the "[h]istory of the parent being abused as a child or adult" and "[t]he
parent's age 143 ." in assessing a child's safety and need for protective

intervention.

The preceding survey of the laws and practices regarding the treatment
of pregnant and parenting wards in New York, California, Illinois, and
Florida, indicates that wards face an up-hill struggle to maintain custody
of their children even where no one has accused them of being unfit to
parent. In the next section, we examine what happens when the state
alleges that a foster child - who is herself the victim of abuse or neglect
has similarly mistreated her own child.

138. Id.

139. Id.
140. See, e.g., Carolyn S. Salisbury & Bernard P. Perlmutter, Avoiding Pot Holes on Florida's
"Road to Independence": Advocacy for Independent Living Services For Foster Youth 13,23 (Mar.
31, 2005), available at http://floridaschildrenfirst.org/fcf 052_indepliving.htm.
141. Id. at 13. But, note, effective July 1,2005, foster youth in Florida may petition the court
to retain jurisdiction over them until they reach the age of nineteen. FLA. STAT. ch. 39.013 (2005).
142. See Salisbury & Perlmutter, supranote 140, at 12. Florida advocates also note that there
is a desperate need for "attorneys to advocate for family preservation for foster youth who have
children." Id.
143. Fla. Dept of Children and Families Operating Procedure No. 175-41, at (6)(b)(l)(i)-(j)
(Apr. 2, 1997).
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IV. CONCURRENT CHILD PROTECTIVE CASES

As discussed above, a parenting ward has the same right to raise her
child as any other parent. As with other parents, the state may abrogate
that right where necessary to protect the ward's child from harm. But
where the parent is herself a ward of the state, the state's decision to bring
a child protective action against her raises a host of unique ethical and
procedural questions. In this section, we examine the problematic nature
of what we have termed "concurrent cases" - that is, two overlapping
child protective cases, the first of which involves the teen ward as a
subject child, and the second of which presents the teen's infant as the
subject child. There is a great gap in information regarding concurrent
cases. The authors could not locate any studies or statistics on the
incidence of the removal and/or commitment to state care of children born
to parents in foster care. Yet advocates in every survey state indicate that
concurrent cases involving parenting wards and their children are a
significant problem.
As with information regarding the incidence of concurrent cases, there
is a lack of information regarding how courts process and manage these
cases. Once again, the authors could not find studies regarding the
handling of these cases. Such an inquiry is particularly difficult given the
exceedingly local nature of child protective proceedings, which vary not
only from state to state but often within states from county to county. For
instance, in New York City alone, the removal rates of children from their
parents for similar incidents varies by borough, as it is highly dependent
upon both the management of the borough branch of the child welfare
agency and the discretion of individual family court judges. The
tremendous variation in case processing makes it difficult to address the
ethical issues confronted by courts in concurrent child protective cases.
Certainly, what is appropriate or even desirable practice for a court of
general jurisdiction staffed by a single judge in a rural county may not be
applicable or desirable for a court of limited jurisdiction staffed by dozens
of judges in a major metropolitan area.
Nevertheless, in any system, concurrent cases present multiple ethical
problems as the system is turned on its head. The parenting ward is forced
to occupy a second role as the respondent parent; the agency responsible
for the teen's daily care and permanency planning may be called to testify
against her; the law office which prosecuted the ward's parents for abuse
or neglect now seeks a finding against the ward; and, more often than not,
the attorney who represents the ward in her case as subject child is unable
or unwilling to represent her as a respondent parent.
This section examines several ethical dilemmas that arise in concurrent
cases: whether it is appropriate for the same judge to hear both cases,
whether it is appropriate for the same attorney to represent the ward in
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both proceedings, and whether it is ethical for the governmental agency
charged with protecting the teen ward to seek a finding against her. The
discussion below does not aim to resolve these dilemmas, but to highlight
the issues they raise and present examples of how various practitioners and
courts have addressed them.
A. The Role of the Court in ConcurrentCases
In some jurisdictions, when the government seeks to remove a ward's
child based on allegations of abuse and neglect, the infant's case is
assigned to the same judge who has jurisdiction over the teen.'" In others,
the case is assigned in the regular manner, and depending on the size of a
court, is likely to come before a different judge. Either system raises
serious questions regarding the judge's mandate, the court's role, and the
minor parent's right to due process. None of the four survey states have a
written protocol on this issue. Because of the pros and cons of having the
same or different judge, advocates have differing views on the best
practice. Not surprisingly, the biggest factor influencing an advocate's
view is the advocate's feeling about the judge's competence and attitude
toward his or her client in any one case. If the judge presiding over the
teen's placement has a good impression of the teen, then advocates prefer
to have the same judge hear the allegations against the teen. On the other
hand, if the original judge is not sympathetic to the teen, advocates prefer
to have a new judge preside over the subsequent case.
A judge presiding over both the case of an adolescent ward and that of
her child whom she has allegedly mistreated faces a conundrum. In most
states, a court in a child protective case must consider the "best interests"
of the child at various junctures, including disposition and proceedings to
terminate parental rights. 145 In many states and counties, child protective
cases are assigned to a specialized court of limited jurisdiction with a
statutory mandate to promote the best interests of the children under its
authority." In many situations, a judge may be able to make findings and
fashion remedies which serve the best interests of both the mother and the
child, reflecting the reality that children generally benefit from an increase

144. According to local advocates, Los Angeles County assigns the infant's case to the same
judge responsible for the teen's case. Telephone interview with Leslie Starr Heimar, Children's
Law Center, in L.A., Cal. (Sept. 15, 2004). But note that the California court system as a whole
does not have any policy on the matter.
145. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ch. 39.810 (2005) (stating that "in a hearing on a petition for
termination of parental rights, the court shall consider the manifest best interests of the child.");
N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 384-b (2005) (requiring that judicial orders to terminate parental rights or
suspend judgment be necessary to protect "the best interests of the child.").
146. For example, California law mandates that its juvenile courts consider "the best interests
of the minor in all deliberations." CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 202(d) (2005).
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in their parents' well-being.' 47 But in the most acute situations - where
the state moves to terminate the teen's parental rights - a court's ability
to honor its mandate to protect both the teen and the infant becomes all but
impossible.
The termination of her parental rights will have permanent, devastating
effects for the teen. Not only will she have no right to parent, visit, or even
receive information about the well-being of this particular child, if the
state brings charges of child maltreatment against her in the future with
regards to another child, she will have no right to reasonable efforts to
keep her family intact. Instead, under the Adoption and Safe Families Act
(ASFA), the court will have the discretion to terminate her rights to that
child in an expedited manner.'48 These provisions will apply no matter
how much time has passed, so that a girl who loses her rights to a child at
the age of fifteen may have that termination used against her regarding her
right to raise children she bears in her twenties or thirties. The termination
itself thus becomes an act contrary to the best interests of the parenting
ward.
In addition, consolidating the cases before the same judge may
compromise the teen ward's procedural rights. The judge, in the role of the
teen's protector, may have access to psychological reports, psychiatric
records, drug tests, and school records about the teen that would otherwise
be unavailable to the court.'49 The same judge may also know if the ward
has a history of risky or defiant actions - i.e., running away from her
placement, missing curfew, truancy - and may hold such actions against
the ward even where the actions occurred prior to the baby's birth or
conception. Equally important, the judge has knowledge of the poor
parenting and trauma to which the teen herself has been exposed. This
information, which would otherwise be irrelevant and inadmissible, has

147. Many scholars have posited a dichotomy between children's well-being and parents'
rights. See, e.g., ELIZABETH BARTHOLET, FAMILY BONDS: ADOPTION AND THE POLITICS OF

PARENTING (1993); David J. Herring, Inclusion of the Reasonable Efforts Requirement in
Termination ofParentalRights Statutes: Punishingthe Childfor the Failuresof the State Child
Welfare System, 54 U. PITT. L. REv. 139 (1992). A significant number, though, have refuted the
notion that children's rights stand in opposition to the rights ofparents or families. See, e.g., Naomi
R. Cahn, Children'sInterests in a FamilialContext: Poverty,FosterCare,andAdoption, 60 OHIO
ST. L.J. 1189 (1999); Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children'sRights?: The Critiqueof
FederalFamily PreservationPolicy, 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112 (1999).
148. 42 U.S.C. 671 (a)(l 5). For a detailed discussion ofAFSA's impact on the requirement that
states make reasonable efforts to preserve and reunify families, see Will L. Crossley, Defining
ReasonableEfforts: Demystifying the States's Burden UnderFederalChildProtectionLegislation,
12 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 259 (2003); Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, Pub. L. 105-89, 111

Stat. 2115 (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
149. Under normal circumstances, these items only become available through court order or
discovery and submission by opposing counsel.
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the potential to prejudice the judge against the teen. Ironically, the more
the teen herself suffered at the hands of the adults responsible for her care,
and the more egregious the abuse inflicted upon her, the more dubious the
judge may be with regards to her own ability to parent.
On a pragmatic level, however, it would be hard to overstate the
benefits of assigning both cases to a single judge. Most importantly,
consolidating the cases before one judge eliminates the maddening
problem of judges issuing conflicting and overlapping orders and service
plans.15 ° For example, where there are twojudges, the judge overseeing the
ward's dependency case may approve the agency's plan to place the ward
in a residential program far from her children, making it impossible for her
to comply with the visitation plan ordered by the judge in her children's
dependency case. In addition, consolidation decreases the number of court
appearances for all parties, and thereby reduces the likelihood of
scheduling conflicts and adjournments.
A judge who presides over both cases is also in the best position to
know if the agency has made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of
the child and/or to reunify the family, a finding required by federal
legislation and mirrored in most states' laws.' 5 ' Such a judge is also best
situated to ensure that the agency's reasonable efforts include providing
services for which the teen parent may be eligible by virtue of being in
foster care - i.e., independent living classes, financial support for higher
or vocational education, comprehensive health services,' and most
importantly, an appropriate foster care placement with or near her child.
In many ways, the benefits of uniting the cases before a single judge
mirror those more generally promoted by two related trends in family
court policy: the movement for unified family courts, and the development

150. See Catherine J.Ross, The FailureofFragmentation:The Promiseofa System of Unified
Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 3 (1998) (discussing the adverse consequences of family courts with
overlapping jurisdiction for family law decision making).
151. See supra note 143.
152. Mandated under the Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnosis and Treatment provision
of Medicaid.
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'
As defined by the American Bar
of "therapeutic jurisprudence."153
Association, the Unified Family Court:

is a comprehensive court with jurisdiction over all family-related
legal matters. The structure of a unified family court promotes the
resolution of family disputes in a fair, comprehensive, and
expeditious way. It allows the court to address the family and its4
long-term needs as well as the problems of the individual litigant.I1
Both therapeutic jurisprudence and the unified family court movement
posit a new role for the family court judge. Instead of a trier of fact and
neutral arbiter of law, the appropriate role of the family court judge is one
of a case manager or counselor. Particularly given the judge's
responsibility under federal law to ensure that reasonable efforts are taken
to maintain or restore family unity,155 a judge may not limit the scope of
a proceeding to the consideration of whether the moving party has met the
relevant standard of proof in establishing the elements of abuse or neglect.
Rather, the judge becomes a "therapeutic agent," whose "role is to try to
prevent further disruptions and further trauma to the child."' 56
Given the enormous prejudice parenting wards face when the state
removes their children, it is hard to balance the need for the procedural
protections promised by a traditional court proceeding with the
"therapeutic" and pragmatic advantages of the case management
approach. 5 7 But the success of each model depends in substantial part on

153. See, e.g., Barbara A. Babb, Fashioningan InterdisciplinaryFrameworkforCourtReform
in FamilyLaw: A Blueprint to Constructa UnifiedFamily Court, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 469 (1998);
Barbara A. Babb, Where We Stand An Analysis of America's Family Law Adjudicatory Systems
and the Mandate to Establish Unified Family Courts, 32 FAM. L.Q. 31 (1998) (illustrating the
integrated court reform initiatives around the nation); Mark Hardin, Child Protection Cases in a
UnifiedFamily Court, 32 FAM. L.Q. 147 (1998); Jane M. Spinak, Adding Value to Families: The
Potentialof Model Family Courts, 2002 WiS. L. REV. 331. Although the unified court movement
began almost a decade ago, it is still more theory than reality in many states. For example, in
interviews with the authors, advocates in Florida joked about how "not unified" the judicial
processes regarding children and families are in that state.
154. American Bar Association, What is a United Family Court?, available at
http://www.abanet.org/unifiedfamcrt/about.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006). The federal
government is actively promoting this model, providing grants to states and localities to create
uniform family courts through the Child Welfare Court Improvement Project (CIP) of the
Children's Bureau of Department of Health & Human Services.
155. Supranote 143.
156. Susan L. Brooks, Therapeutic Jurisprudenceand Preventive Law in Child Welfare
Proceedings:A FamilySystems Approach, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 951, 955 (1999).
157. Advocates have noted that the same problem exists in other proceedings, particularly
juvenile delinquency proceedings which are often criticized for neglecting a young person's due
process rights in favor of the judge's supposed consideration of a child's interests. For example,
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the role of the respondent's lawyer. The traditional, adversarial model can
only function to preserve parents' rights where those parents are zealously
represented by qualified counsel. On the other hand, the case management
model functions best where not only the judge, but also the teen's lawyer,
participate both in the ward's case and that of her child.
B. The Role of Counselfor the ParentingWard
The parenting ward facing allegations of child maltreatment may or
may not already have a lawyer. As with court procedures, practices
regarding the representation of children in child welfare proceedings vary
widely from state to state. The federal government has tied the receipt of
certain child welfare funds to the state's provision of guardians ad litem
to children in protective proceedings. 5 The guardian ad litem may be a
lawyer, but the state may choose instead to employ a court-appointed
special advocate (CASA) to represent the child. 5 Many states have
chosen the latter, far less expensive route, relying predominantly on lay
advocates and volunteers to advocate on behalf of children in abuse and
neglect cases. Indiana is the only state that does not mandate the
appointment of some type of guardian ad litem. 6 ° Of the states surveyed
here, Florida is the only one to rely solely on lay advocates. 161 In contrast,
California, New York, and Illinois all require that
62 children in abuse and
neglect proceedings be represented by counsel. 1
On the other hand, when the ward becomes a respondent parent, she is
more likely to have assigned counsel. Although the U.S. Supreme Court
has determined that the Constitution does not require that every parent be
63
provided with counsel in every proceeding to terminate parental rights, 1
most states require the appointment of counsel at certain stages of a child
protective proceeding.' Nevertheless, practitioners and policymakers

in New York, bench trials repeatedly before the same judge usually result in the imposition of
longer "sentences" to juveniles than they would get in a criminal court.
158. 42 U.S.C. § 5106a(b)(2)(A)(xiii) (2005).
159. Id.
160. Astra Outley, Representationfor Children andParentsin Dependency Proceedings,at
11 n. 12, availableat http://pewfostercare. org/research/docs/Representation.pdf (last visited Mar.

28, 2006).
161. FLA. STAT. § 39.822,39.807, & 39.820 (2005); ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/2-17 (2005); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 317.5 (West 2005); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 241 (McKinney 2005).
162. See supra note 161.
163. Lassiter v. Dep't ofSoc. Servs., 42 U.S. 18 (1981).
164. For instance, during fact-finding, disposition, and proceedings to terminate rights.
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have noted a crisis in the representation of parents in child protective
proceedings. 65
'
The lack of skilled and properly-resourced counsel for parents can be
particularly acute in the case of parenting wards. Although many parenting
wards already have a guardian ad litem assigned to them, this person is
unlikely to represent them in the subsequent case. For example, most
institutional providers of legal representation for children decline to
66
represent their clients in a second proceeding as respondent parents.1
Many organizations representing children see the representation of parents
-

even minor parents -

as conflicting with the fundamental mission of

their agency.
In this subsection, we examine the role of counsel for the parenting
ward. Is it a conflict of interest for institutional and/or individual attorneys
representing children in child protective proceedings to represent those
same children as respondent parents? If there is no conflict, is such
representation advisable? 167 Can an attorney comfortably occupy both
roles? Finally, we examine one case, In re Rose Lee Ann, in which a
lawyer struggled with precisely these issues.
1. The Role of Counsel for the Teenager in a Child
Protective Proceeding
The appropriate role of the attorney for the child in a child protection
proceeding lies at the heart of the questions raised above. As Jean Koh
Peters relates in her comprehensive treatise on the subject, an examination

165. See, e.g., Kathleen A. Baille, The Other Neglected Parties in Child Protective
Proceedings: Parentsin Poverty and the Lawyers Who Represent Them, 66 FORDHAM L. REV.
2285,2305-09 (1998); Sheri Bonstelle & Christine Schessler,AdjourningJustice:New YorkState's
Failure to Support Assigned Counsel Violates the Rights of Families in Abuse and Neglect
Proceedings,28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1151, 1173-77, 1186-93 (2001); Susan Calkins, Ineffective
Assistance of Counselin Parental-RightsTermination Case: The ChallengeforAppellate Courts,
6 J. APp. PRAC. & PROCESS 179, 184-87 (2004).
166. For instance, the biggest institutional providers of representation to children and young
people in New York City all decline to have the same attorney who represented the child as a ward
to represent the teen ward as a respondent-parent. These include the Juvenile Rights Division of
the Legal Aid Society and Lawyers for Children. However, at least one California organization has
developed an alternate system to ensure that the teen ward is adequately represented in her role as
parent. Los Angeles's Children's Law Center allows attorneys in another department to represent
teen wards as respondents in child protective cases, but builds a "firewall" so that information is
not shared. In contrast, no division of New York City's Legal Aid Society represents any parent in
a child protective proceeding because of its concern about conflicts from its Juvenile Rights
Division's representation of children in the vast majority of NYC's child protective cases.
167. For a broader discussion of the various conflicts of interest which arise in the
representation of children in child protection proceedings, see Christopher N. Wu, Conflicts of
Interest in the RepresentationofChildren inDependency Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1857(1996).
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of the role
the attorney for the subject child in all fifty states reveals
' of
"chaos."168
The role of the lawyer as defined by local statute and
regulations varies widely from state to state. To make matters more
difficult, Peters notes that: "[I]n almost any state in which one represents
clients, one will encounter within the state a deep disagreement in practice
about the role of the child's lawyer and what the content of the best
interests of the child is, regardless of the wording of the governing law."' 69
Literature on this front generally addresses two predominant - and
conflicting - models for the role of the child's lawyer: the guardian ad
litem, who is charged by the court with representing the child's best
interests, and the traditional attorney, who is charged with representing the
child's stated interests.
Where teenage clients are concerned, there is more of a consensus
at least in the literature 70 - that lawyers representing adolescents should
follow the same rules for professional conduct that govern the
representation of adults. 7 ' Although all children under the age of eighteen
suffer from a legal disability, teenagers on the whole are able to
communicate concrete wishes regarding case outcomes and understand the
risks and benefits of alternate courses of action. 7 2 Therefore, teenagers are
better able than younger children to play the traditional role of an adult
client in a legal proceeding.

168. JEAN KOH PETERS, REPRESENTING CHILDREN IN CHILD PROTECTIVE PROCEEDINGS:

ETHICAL AND PRACTICAL DIMENSIONS 33 (2d ed. 2001). For information on standards for
representing children in the United States and around the world, see Representing Children
Worldwide, availableat www.law.yale.edu/rcw.
169. PETERS, supra note 168, at 42.
170. See id. at 48 (noting that "very few authors currently suggest that a teenage child, for
instance, should be represented in the mode espoused by the early writers on the guardian ad litem"
that is, by having the lawyer set the goals of and direct the representation); Wu, supra note 167, at
1859 (noting that "[i]ncreasingly, the academic literature reveals a growing consensus that the
proper role of an attorney for a child is to represent the client's wishes (as opposed to the attorney's
conception of the minor's best interests) consistent with the minor's age and cognitive ability.").
171. This is the approach supported by the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct.
CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL

CONDUCT (6th ed. 2004).
172. Id. R. 1.14.
[A] client with diminished capacity often has the ability to understand, deliberate
upon, and reach conclusions about matters affecting the client's own well-being.
For example, children as young as five or six years of age, and certainly those of
ten or twelve, are regarded as having opinions that are entitled to weight in legal
proceedings concerning their custody.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW& PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 17

There is also a pragmatic reason for attorneys representing teens to
advocate for their clients' expressed interests. As social workers in the
field sometimes put it, "teenagers can walk." Adolescents easily and
readily defy decisions made by their attorneys or by the court.'73 Unlike
infants and small children, they can run away from placements, refuse to
attend visits with parents or siblings, and fail to keep counseling
appointments scheduled by others. Given that a teenager has sufficient
autonomy to disregard court and agency decisions regarding her care, an
attorney who wants to ensure compliance with court orders has no choice
but to enlist her client's active participation in setting the goals of
representation. Nevertheless, a lawyer may find that state laws or local
practice may require her to represent the "best interests" of an adolescent
client, even where those interests diverge from the client's expressed
wishes.
2. Applying a Conflict-of-Interest Analysis to Concurrent Child
Welfare Proceedings
As discussed above, lawyers for adolescents in child protective
proceedings may variously be charged with representing the client's stated
interests, the client's best interests, or something else entirely. While both
the court and appointed counsel may treat a teenager as a child for
purposes of her representation, that presumption disappears when the teen
herself faces allegations of mistreating her own child.'74 In order to
determine if representing the client in both cases raises a conflict, the
lawyer must first determine his or her role. Thus, the rules governing
conflicts of interest must be applied to two situations: first, where the
lawyer is appointed to represent the child's best interests, and second,
1 75
where the lawyer is appointed to represent the child's stated interests.
173. Wallace J. Mlyniec, A Judge's Ethical Dilemma: Assessing A Child's Capacity to
Choose, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1873, 1875 (1996) (observing that "[judges] know... that enforcing
orders that conflict with a child's desires is difficult. For example, older children mayjust run away
from the home or hospital in which the judge places them.").
174. See, e.g., M.C. v. Dep't of Children and Family Services, 814 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2001) (holding that respondent mother, who was a minor, was not entitled to the appointment
of a guardian ad litem in a proceeding to terminate her parental rights, because the role requiring
that a child be represented by a guardian ad litem in such a proceeding does not include a parent
who happens to be a minor).
175. Materials specifically addressing concurrent conflicts are rarely written with poverty law
or child representation in mind, and hence can be difficult to apply to those arenas. See, e.g.,
PETERS, supranote 168 (stating that there is a "general consensus in literature that model rules offer
the practitioner inadequate guidance when representing children"); Ann M. Haralambie, The Role
of the Child'sAttorney in Protectingthe Child Throughoutthe LitigationProcess,71 N.D. L. REV.
939, 944 (1995) (observing that the "ethical rules were not drafted with child advocacy in mind").
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Rule 1.7 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct prohibits lawyers
from representing a client where there is a conflict of interest among
current clients.' 7 The Rule sets up a distinction between two types of
conflicts - those which can be overcome, and those which are in all
instances prohibited.' Conflicts which cannot be overcome include the
representation of one client against another client in the same or a different
proceeding, and representation which is prohibited by law. 178 Other
conflicts may be overcome if the lawyer reasonably believes in his ability
to represent79both clients diligently and each client gives informed consent
in writing. 1
Representing a parenting ward as both a subject child and as a
respondent parent does not constitute prohibited representation. Such
representation is not prohibited by law, and although the parenting ward
has a very different status in her two cases, she is one client. This is true
regardless of whether the attorney represents the client's stated interests
or best interests. Thus, by representing her in both cases the attorney or
firm does not engage in prohibited representation under Rule 1.7.
Rule 1.7 also delineates two types of conflicts which maybe overcome.
First, subsection (a)(1) describes situations in which the representation of

Nonetheless, the Model Rules and the literature discussing them provide an important foundation
for any discussion of professional conduct.
176. CENTER FOR PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY ABA, ANNOTATED MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]. The Rule provides:
(a)

(1)
(2)

(b)
(1)
(2)
(3)

(4)

Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if
the representation involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent
conflict of interest exists if:
the representation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or
there is a significant risk that the representation of one or more clients will
be materially limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another client, a
former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under
paragraph (a), a lawyer may represent a client if:
the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to provide
competent and diligent representation to each affected client;
the representation is not prohibited by law;
the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or
other proceeding before a tribunal; and
each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.

Id. R. 1.7.
177. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. [14-17].
178. Id. R. 1.7(b).
179. Id.
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one client is directly adverse to another client. 80 Once again, regardless of
the model of representation, the teen is only one client, and hence
representing her in two cases is not a conflict under this section. Second,
subsection (a)(2) describes situations which present a significant risk that
the representation of a client will be materially limited by a range of
factors, including not just another client, but also a third person or the
attorney's personal interests.'' The Comment accompanying the Rule
defines a "material limitation" as a "significant risk that a lawyer's ability
to consider, recommend or carry out an appropriate course of action for
the client will be materially' limited as a result of the lawyer's other
responsibilities or interests. 182
Here, the role of the attorney is vital to determining whether or not
there is a conflict. If a lawyer follows the model of the guardian ad litem,
it will be difficult for that lawyer to extend his representation to the teen
as a respondent parent. Such a situation would require that the lawyer
represent the client's best interests in one case, and the client's stated
interests in the second. The need for the attorney to juggle these two roles
poses a significant risk that the attorney's ability to consider an
appropriate course of action will be compromised. Where the lawyer and
the client disagree about the client's best interests, the attorney will be in
the untenable situation of zealously representing the client's stated wishes
in one case and undermining those same wishes in the second. Particularly
where the cases are pending before the same tribunal, the attorney's ability
to effectively argue either position would be severely compromised.
If, on the other hand, the lawyer in the teen's own child protective case
represents the client's stated interests, no such conflict arises when the
lawyer extends her representation to include the teen's case as a
respondent parent. Instead, the lawyer may present a consistent story
regarding her client's wishes to the court, opposing counsel, and social
services staff. In this way, the lawyer can protect her client's rights both
as a foster child and as a parent.
3. An Area for Caution: Positional Conflicts
The above discussion focuses on the representation of a single client.
But few if any lawyers represent only one client at a time. In fact, both
independent and institutional providers of representation for children tend

180. Id.R. 1.7(a)(1), (2)(2).
181. MODEL RULES, supra note 176, R. 1.7(a)(2).
182. Id. R. 1.7 cmt. [8].
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to have heavy caseloads, and institutional providers' 83 in large cities have
hundreds if not thousands of clients. 8" As discussed below, there is no per
se conflict for a practitioner or legal aid office to regularly represent both
parents and children in child protection cases, as long as they do not
represent adverse parties in any particular case. In fact, more often than
not, advocates for children seek to secure services for their clients' parents
that directly benefit both parties. However, problems may arise where the
attorney or office engages in appellate advocacy and/or law reform efforts.
Lawyers and law offices are permitted to represent clients whose
positions may at times be ideologically or legally opposed. As the
Comments to Rule 1.7 state:
Ordinarily a lawyer may take inconsistent legal positions in
different tribunals at different times on behalf of different clients.
The mere fact that advocating a legal position on behalf of one
client might create a precedent adverse to the interests of a client
in an unrelated matter does not create a
represented by the lawyer
85
conflict of interest. 1
Nevertheless, a conflict may arise where actions that a lawyer takes on
behalf of one client will materially limit the lawyer's effectiveness in
representing another client. For example, "when a decision favoring one
client will create a precedent likely to seriously weaken the position taken
on behalf' of the other client.' ' 186 This is generally known as a "positional
conflict. 17
Accordingly, representing both parents and children in child protective
proceedings does not itself present a conflict, even where such
representation requires the lawyer or firm to take "inconsistent legal
positions" before different judges, at different times, on behalf of those
various clients. 8 A conflict arises only when the lawyer's advocacy on
behalf of one client "materially limits" her effectiveness as counsel for a
second client. The Comment to Rule 1.7 list several relevant factors in
determining when such a conflict is likely to arise, including where the
cases are pending, whether the issue is substantive or procedural, whether

183. For purposes of conflicts of interest, the Model Rules state that, "depending upon the
structure of the organization [of a legal aid or services entity] the entire organization or different
components of it may constitute a firm or firms." Id. R. 1.10.
184. PETERS, supra note 168, at 51.
185. MODEL RULES, supra note 176, R. 1.7 cmt. [24].
186. Id.
187. See R. David Donoghue, Conflicts of Interest: ConcurrentRepresentation, 11 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 319 (1998).
188. MODEL RULES, supra note 176, R. 1.7 cmt [24].

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLICPOLICY

[Vol. 17

the matters will be heard at precisely the same time, the significance of the
issue to the interests of the clients involved, and the client's reasonable
expectations in retaining the lawyer.'89 In the clearest example, it is almost
always a conflict of interest for a lawyer or organization to argue two
opposing interpretations of a law in front of one appellate court during the
same period of time.19
Although positional litigation conflicts may arise in practices
representing both parents and children, it is just as likely that in appellate
cases regarding a particular question of law, the interests of both the child
client and the respondent parent client will be promoted by the same
argument. For example, say a child and a respondent parent both brought
independent suits claiming that the county's policy regarding visitation of
children in foster care unlawfully and unreasonably limits interaction
between foster children and their biological families. Even in the unlikely
case that the appeals were heard close in time and by the same judge,
representing both clients would present no conflict of interest.' 9
Positional conflicts may also arise where an organization engages in
law reform. The classic lobbying conflict arises "when a firm is hired by
a client to promote a position for one client on an issue and then a second
client retains the firm to promote or litigate another position on the same
issue that is adverse to the first client's interests."' 92 In such cases, it may
be appropriate for the firm to represent both clients, but only after
obtaining written, informed consent from both parties.'93 This is not
readily applicable to legal aid offices, which are rarely, if ever, retained by
clients for lobbying services. Rather, most legal aid offices engage in
lobbying efforts on their own initiative and, in a sense, on their own behalf
or on behalf of the public good. If the office regularly represents both
parents and children in child protective proceedings, each client may
reasonably expect that the office, when engaging in law reform activities,
will espouse a position which reflects the balance of its experience and
practice, and not the position that would best promote his or her particular
interests. As above, it is important to note that the interests of respondent
parent and children clients are not necessarily in conflict. For example, a

189. Id.
190. Donoghue, supra note 187, at 324.
191. In fact, lawyers for children report that the parent's and child's positions very often align
at the trial level, too, such that the child's lawyer and the parent's lawyer work collaboratively to
get services for the parent so that the child can be returned home.
192. Donoghue, supra note 187, at 325.
193. See MODEL RuLEs, supra note 176, R. 1.7(b)(4). It is important to note that the Model
Rules specifically permit individual lawyers to engage in law reform activities via an institution or
entity which is independent of their practice, such as a committee of the bar association, even where
such efforts may affect the interests of their clients. See id.R. 6.4.
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bill to improve case processing times or to ensure adequate access to
mental health services for a child in foster care may equally serve the
interests of parents and children.
4. Discomfort with Representing Teen Parents
The parenting ward accused of child maltreatment embodies a direct
challenge to the presumption that parents' and children's interests are at
odds. The parenting ward is both a parent and a neglected child, and yet
her interests are unified: to keep or regain custody of her child, to obtain
those services to which she is entitled as a foster child, and to have a say
in decisions regarding long-term goals for herself and her child. Given the
absence of any conflict of interest in representing a teen in concurrent
cases, why is it so rare for attorneys and law offices to do so? Perhaps, in
the end, the decision by children's attorneys not to extend representation
to clients who become respondents is less about perceived (and generally
specious) conflicts of interest, and more about such advocates' reluctance
to stray from a narrow professional role. 94 This is a common phenomenon
in the representation of children in family court. As one author explains:
Lawyers for children have been less successful than we would like
in representing the child-in-context, because the lawyer has
inadvertently become the context for most child representation.
Both the lawyer's personal and professional context have tended to
overwhelm the child-in-context.' 95
This tendency is exacerbated by the enormous burdens under which most
lawyers for children operate: high caseloads, low pay, inadequate
supervision, little or no support staff, cramped offices, crowded
courtrooms, case backlogs, overwhelmed judges, insufficiently trained
child protective workers, and inattention to the vicarious traumas of
working with children and families in crisis.' 96 The following discussion
of In re Rose Lee Ann presents one example of an attorney's struggle to
reconcile his "personal and professional context" with his teen clients'
advocacy needs.
194. For a discussion of how lawyers who represent parents accused of child maltreatment are
vilified by the prosecution, the public, and sometimes a court, and of the extreme discomfort such
cases may raise for lawyers, see Bruce A. Boyer, EthicalIssues in the Representation of Parents
in Child Welfare Cases, 64 FORDHAM L. REv. 1621 (1996).
195. PETERS, supra note 168, at 24.

196. Id. at 51 (noting that "practitioners... are often working under such strained and underresourced circumstances that they have little time for reflection and evaluation of their work"); id.
at 40, n. 1I (detailing survey of compensation rates for lawyers for children in child protective
proceedings).
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5. A Case Study: In re Rose Lee Ann
In In re Rose Lee Ann L., 97 Cook County filed a neglect petition
against Lisa Ann Ramos and Melvin Lewis, two teenaged wards of the
State of Illinois, alleging that they had neglected their daughter, Rose. 9
In their own cases as abused and neglected children, Lisa Ann and Melvin
were both represented by the Cook County Public Guardian, Patrick
Murphy.'99 At the initial hearing regarding Rose's custody, the court
appointed Murphy to again represent Lisa Ann and Melvin, this time in
their capacity as respondent parents. 0 0 Murphy, accustomed to the role of
attorney for the subject child, asked the trial court to clarify his role as
respondents' attorney. 211 Specifically, he asked whether he was supposed
to "play a traditional role in an attempt to vigorously represent [his] clients
irrespective of the facts and to vigorously cross-examine and keep certain
facts out" or if he should "play a more general role and try to advocate for
what is in the best interest of the little girl" - that is, his clients' child,
Rose.20 2 The trial court replied that his role in the proceeding was "the
traditional role as attorney for mother and father., 2 3 Over the course of the
.case, Murphy made various attempts either to certify for appeal certain
questions regarding his role or to withdraw as counsel for Lisa Ann and
Melvin, all of which were denied by the trial court, despite the fact that the
requests to withdraw were supported by his clients. 2°
Murphy's repeated attempts to withdraw and/or obtain clarification
regarding his role indicated his extreme reservations regarding his clients'
ability to care for Rose. For example, shortly after the initial hearing,
Murphy filed a motion asking the trial court to certify the following
questions for immediate appeal:
A. Does an attorney representing a parent in a child protection
proceeding have an obligation to disclose to the court information

197. 718 N.E. 2d 623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). Although the authors found a handful of cases
discussing the rights ofparenting wards who become respondents, the authors could only locate one
published decision specifically addressing the role of counsel for the ward-cum-respondent.
Nevertheless, that decision, by an Illinois Appellate Court, touches on almost all of the issues
discussed above.
198. Id.at 624.
199. Id.at 625.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Rose, 718 N.E. 2d at 625.
203. Id.at 625.
204. Id.at 625-26.
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that demonstrates that the parent may present a risk of serious
bodily harm to the parent's defenseless child?
B. If the attorney obtains information that his client may present a
risk of serious bodily harm to the client's child, in his role as
attorney and guardian ad litem for the parent in the parent's case as
an abused and neglected child, does the attorney have an obligation
this information out of evidence in the case of
to attempt to keep 205
the parent's child?
Although ostensibly hypothetical, Question A leaves the reader with a
distinct impression that Murphy had information demonstrating that his
clients presented "a risk of serious bodily harm" to their "defenseless"
child. Question B then further indicates that Murphy not only possesses
such information about his clients, but that the information is so
compelling that he seeks to waive attorney-client privilege in order to
disclose it to the trial court. Later in the proceedings, Murphy explicitly
In a motion to withdraw, Murphy indicates that he is in a
states as much.
"quandary." 206 He writes that he "has information in his file of a work
product nature which he and other lawyers on his staff have gleaned from
both conversations with the respondent-parents as well as their analysis of
documents in the case which lead them to a certain conclusion., 207 Not
surprisingly, the trial court reached the same conclusion, entering a
dispositional order declaring Rose to be a ward of the state and placing her
in foster care.20 8
Murphy then appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to
withdraw, including in his brief several hypothetical questions along the
lines of those discussed above. 2 ' The appellate court refrained from
addressing any of Murphy's hypothetical questions, as that would have
required the issuance of an advisory opinion. 2 Instead, the appellate court
applied local laws governing the withdrawal of counsel.2 ' The court held
that a trial judge has discretion to deny such a motion only "if the granting

205. Id. at 625.
206. Id. at 626.
207. Rose, 718 N.E. 2d at 625. At anotherjuncture, Murphy asked the appellate court, "[w]hat
do I do if I think that there is no way that this kid should ever live with the parents?" Id. at 627. And
again, "what do we do if we know that these parents - or very firmly believe - no one can know
everything in this life, but as much of our experience and intelligence permits, we really believe
that the parents should not parent the child?" Id.
208. Id. at 626.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 627.
211. Id.
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of it would delay the trial of the case, or would otherwise be
inequitable., 212 As Lisa Ann and Melvin would not have been prejudiced
by the withdrawal, the appellate court concluded that the trial court
improperly denied Murphy's request to withdraw from the case.213
In addition, the appellate court reasoned that Murphy had not only the
right to withdraw, he had an ethical duty to withdraw based on his
expressed inability to abide by his clients' objectives concerning the
litigation as required by the Illinois Code of Professional Conduct. 214 Thus,
the appellate court implicitly assumed that the role for the attorney
representing parenting wards accused of child maltreatment is not that of
representing the clients' best interests, or presenting facts to the court, but
the traditional role of zealous advocate as governed by the professional
rules of conduct.
Certainly, an attorney assigned to represent parents she believes often based on overwhelming evidence - to pose a serious threat to their
children will find the task emotionally difficult. At the same time, such
parents generally have a right to be represented by counsel. 215 In addition,
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct suggest that the legal profession
has a duty to ensure the representation of destitute, controversial, or
unsympathetic clients.216 Parenting wards accused of child maltreatment
are often all three.
Unfortunately, as discussed above, in most of the country there is a
lack of adequate counsel for parents that may exceed the lack of quality
counsel for children. For example, in Chicago, there is an institutional
provider of legal services for children in child protective proceedings the Public Guardian's Office, in which Murphy was employed.217 Yet there
is no parallel institution charged with representing parents. Perhaps, if
such an organization existed, the trial court in In re Rose Lee Ann would
have been less reluctant to relieve Murphy of his duties - or may never
have appointed him to the case at all. Murphy acknowledged the relative
power of his office when he asked the trial court:

212. Rose, 718 N.E. 2d at 627.
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. This right is based variously on state laws, state constitutions, and on a case-by-case
basis, the U.S. Constitution.
216. MODEL RULES, supra note 176, R. 1.2, cmt. [5]. "Legal representation should not be
denied to people who are unable to afford legal services, or whose cause is controversial or the
subject of popular disapproval. By the same token, representing a client does not constitute
approval of the client's views or activities." Id.
217. Rose, 718 N.E. 2d at 624. This is true in other large jurisdictions as well, including New
York City.
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Assuming, for purposes of argument, that the conclusion is that it
would be harmful for ... the child to live with the parents, must the

Public Guardian vigorously pursue, with all of his legal acumen,
and with all of his legal staff's resources, the litigation strategy set
forth by the clients, or must he attempt to somehow reach a nonadversarial compromise which would protect the child and, at the
same time, advance the cause of his clients? 18
Parenting wards deserve the benefit of counsel who will "vigorously
pursue" their interests with "legal acumen" and with the resources of a
well-staffed office. Whether such representation should be provided by the
same attorney who represented the parenting ward in her case as an abused
or neglected minor, or whether the ward should be assigned new counsel,
is a matter of debate. Either way, advocates and courts alike have an
obligation to create procedures that ensure parenting wards who become
respondents have access to at least the same level of counsel they enjoy as
subject children.219
C. The Role of the ChildProtectiveAgency in ConcurrentProceedings
Arguably there is a conflict where the child protective agency charged
with the custody and protection of a ward is the same agency prosecuting
(in the civil sense) the child protective case against the minor parent.
Nonetheless, this is the practice in all four survey states, none of which
require appointment of a "special prosecutor" in such cases.22°
Two New York courts recently declined to find that the relationship
between a child protective agency and a minor ward created an
unacceptable conflict of interest that would require the agency attorney to
withdraw from the case to be replaced by a special prosecutor. In In re Ta
Fon EdwardJ.B.,221 the child protective agency initiated a proceeding to
terminate the parental rights of one of its own wards. 222 The respondent
ward argued that the agency had a conflict of interest in that pursuing the
termination of her rights was an implicit violation of the agency's statutory
mandate to protect her best interests.223 She therefore called for the

218. Id. at 626.
219. Or where, as in Florida, wards are not entitled to the appointment of a lawyer, that upon
becoming respondents they are provided with competent counsel.
220. The authors could not find a decision to the contrary.
221. 774 N.Y.S. 2d 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004).
222. Id. at 821.
223. Id.
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dismissal of the agency attorney and the appointment of a special
prosecutor.224
The Ta Fon court refused, concluding that the respondent parent's
status as a ward of the state had no impact whatsoever on the case. 2 5 The
agency's duties were the same whether the respondent was totally
unknown to it or a ward in the agency's own care: "Nothing in the Family
Court Act or the Social Services Law," the Ta Fon court wrote, "lessens,
increases, or otherwise changes the responsibilities of either ACS or its
contract agencies when faced with caring for the offspring of a foster
child. 226 Similarly, in a case affirming the right of parenting wards to
maintain physical and legal custody of their infants, the New York Court
of Appeals pointed out that if "there is concern that a particular child is
being neglected or abused in the foster care placement [with his or her
parent]," the agency can file a child protective proceeding against the
parent, as in any other case.227
However, while not going so far as to mandate a special prosecutor,
some courts have found suspicious the fact that the same agency charged
with protecting the parenting ward is also charged with protecting the
infant.228 In In re Lawrence Children,229 the child welfare agency filed a
neglect petition against a teenaged ward in the agency's care. 230 As in In
re Ta Fon J.B., the ward argued that it was a conflict of interest for the
agency charged with caring for her to bring a neglect action against her.23'
While declining, like the Ta Fon court, to appoint a special prosecutor, the
judge in Lawrence asserted that child protective cases against wards were
not like other cases.232 Unlike other respondent parents, parenting wards
are in the care of an agency which is both statutorily mandated and courtordered to educate, support, encourage, and monitor them. Where a ward
has failed in her role as parent, there is a high likelihood that the agency
has failed in its role of caring for the ward. Thus, the Lawrence court
found that the child protective agency should exercise its discretion not to
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Ta Fon Edward,6 A.D. 3d at 821.
227. In re Tyriek W.,85 N.Y.2d 774, 780 (N.Y. 1995).
228. See, e.g., In re TriciaM., 451 N.Y.S.2d 553, 554 (N.Y. Faro. Ct. 1982) (stating that the
circumstances were "highly questionable" when the mother teen ward's signature of a voluntary
placement agreement for her child was obtained half an hour after regaining consciousness after
giving birth by "the very agency whose ward she was.").
229. 768 N.Y.S.2d 83 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2003).
230. Id.at 87. The minor at issue was represented by an attorney Law Guardian in her child
protective case and by a different attorney in the child protective case brought against her as a
parent. Id.
231. Id.
232. Id.

THE LEGAL STATUS OF PREGNANT AND PARENTING YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE

pursue a neglect or abuse finding "if a lack of supervision of the
respondent [parent] by her caretaker contributed to the commission of the
neglectful act."233 The Lawrence court concluded that the exercise of such
discretion was particularly appropriate where, as in the case before it, the
caregiver who failed to supervise the respondent is the same state agency
prosecuting her for abuse or neglect.234
In practice, advocates for minor wards frequently make the argument
that the foster care system is at least partially responsible for any parenting
failures; the foster care agency is akin to a person legally responsible for
the infant. Following the same logic, the Illinois child protective agency
will often refuse to initiate a child protection investigation if the report of
abuse or neglect was made by the minor parent's foster parent or
institutional caregiver since such adults are charged with supervising both
the mother and the child's care.
V. BEST PRACTICES FOR REPRESENTING PREGNANT AND
PARENTING WARDS

While determining the fairest or most efficient method for processing
concurrent cases is problematic, best practices regarding the representation
of pregnant and parenting wards in general are easier to identify. Better
yet, an advocate's creative and zealous work on behalf of a parenting ward
may prevent the teen from ever becoming a respondent. The advocate's
goal is to ensure that the individual client obtains the services she needs
to exit from the foster care system with her parental rights intact, and with
the ability to care for herself and her child. While the panoply of services
necessary for any foster child to successfully exit the system are beyond
the scope of this Article, seven services which are of particular importance
to parenting wards are addressed below: joint placement, parenting skills,
childcare, education, family planning, services for young fathers, and
discharge planning.
A. Joint Placement
If young parents are to assume daily responsibility for the care of their
children after discharge, they must be allowed to practice that
responsibility while in foster care. Ensuring that the young mother and her
child are placed together is a primary responsibility of the ward's attorney.
Reports and anecdotal evidence suggest that local child welfare systems
do not have enough mother/child placements to meet the population's

233. Id.at 90.
234. Lawrence, 768 N.Y.S.2d at 90-91.
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needs.235 In Illinois, the lack of appropriate placements too often results in
postnatal stays in temporary shelters.236 In California, the legislature has
officially acknowledged that the dearth of placements results in temporary
separations of parenting wards and their children.237 In New York, the
scarcity of mother/child beds often results in the mother and infant
remaining in the hospital long after they are medically ready for
discharge.238 In other instances, the mother is discharged to her prior
placement while her baby remains in the hospital nursery.23 9 This
separation of mother and infant is damaging to both.24 ° The baby is left
alone in the hospital for the entire night and portions of the day, precluding
breast feeding and crucial bonding with the mother. The state, in turn, pays
an enormous price to keep a healthy child in the hospital.
Such separations are counterproductive and inhumane. They are also
" ' Attorneys for parenting wards can address this problem from
illegal.24
several angles. First, in some cases, steps may be taken while the ward is
pregnant to ensure that the relevant agency is making appropriate plans for
the client's post-pregnancy placement. In New York City, as in other
locales, this is difficult at best because mother/child placements are
awarded on a first-come, first-served basis.242 Additionally, due to the
higher demand for beds and the high cost of leaving beds vacant, programs
are unable to reserve beds for pregnant teens.243 Nevertheless, advocates
can seek court orders directing the ward's agency to make appropriate
plans for the teen's placement following delivery.
Next, when a client is illegally separated from her child, attorneys have
several options. In most states, the parent may file a writ of habeas corpus
against the child welfare or foster care agency, demanding that the child
be returned to the mother.2" In some circumstances, an attorney's threat
to initiate such action will be sufficient to motivate the agency to reunite

235. TPSN, supra note 129, at 6; Youth Advocacy Center, Caringfor Our Children, at 3-4,
8,28 (1995), availableathttp://www.youthadvocacycenter.org/pdf/caringforourchildren.pdf, S.B.
1178, 154th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004); Sheppard & Woltman, supra note 13, at 3, 6.
236. Youth Advocacy Center, supra note 235, at 19.
237. S.B. 1178, ch. 841.
238. See Youth Advocacy Center, supra note 235, at 24.
239. Id. at 23-24.
240. See id. at 25-28.
241. Id.
242. This system was initially mandated by the settlement in Wilder. See BERNSTEIN, supra
note 55. Although the Wilder settlement is no longer binding, the city has by and large continued
the practice of assigning beds on a first-come, first-served basis. Id.
243. See id.
244. See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 115(b) & 651.
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mother and child in an appropriate placement. Another option is to seek
relief from a court with jurisdiction over the teen's foster care placement.
The attorney should avail herself of state policies, such as those discussed
above,2 45 to argue that the ward has a right to placement with her child. For
example, attorneys in California can now argue that the court or the
agency has failed to make diligent and active efforts to place "the minor
parent and the child together in as family-like a setting as possible" as
mandated by state statute.2 46 In all jurisdictions, the attorney should also
argue that separating the ward from her child is clearly contrary to the
ward's best interests. Finally, in negotiating with state or local bureaucrats,
advocates should point out that as long as the parenting ward retains legal
custody of the infant, failure to place the mother and child together will
compromise the state's ability to receive federal reimbursement for the
infant's care.
B. ParentingSkills
To ensure that parenting wards are able to care for their children
properly, and thereby end the cycle of foster care placements, these young
parents must have access to effective training and support. Foster care
placements developed specifically for this population often offer on-site
child development and/or parenting classes to the youth in their care.
However, some do not, and many pregnant and parenting teens are in
regular foster boarding homes lacking any programs targeted to this
population.
Regardless of placement type, parenting wards may be exposed to
coercive threats by adults to remove their children from their care. These
threats are exacerbated by caseworkers' ignorance of the legal status of
parenting wards and their children. Caseworkers may mistakenly assert
that children born to foster youth are automatically in the custody of the
child protective system. Alternatively, caseworkers may insist that since
the parenting ward is unable to support the infant on her own, any
behavior which results in her dismissal from the program will empower
the agency to assume custody of her child. In an environment of arbitrary
and coercive threats, wards may come to view all allegations of abuse or
neglect as retaliatory, and lose sight of which actions actually pose a threat
to the safety of their children.
With so much misinformation afoot, attorneys need to educate their
clients about their rights as parents, and help each client identify and
obtain those services that she feels will help her become a better parent.
Advocates working with this population should offer their clients
245. Supra Part III.C.
246. S.B. 1178 ch. 841 § 2(e).
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brochures or guides explaining the rights of teen parents in care,247 and
should take the time to ensure that the teen actually understands her legal
relationship to her baby. In addition, advocates should provide parenting
wards with information about child abuse and neglect, both to encourage
teens to think critically about parenting and so that teens may protect
themselves from allegations.248 In California, for example, agencies are
now mandated to provide parenting wards with parenting classes.249
Attorneys should ask judges for an order enforcing this mandate where
necessary. Finally, in every jurisdiction, advocates should assist clients in
accessing parenting classes, young parents' support groups, and
counseling, both by making appropriate referrals and, where necessary, by
asking a court to order the provision of the needed services.
C. Childcare
Parenting wards are unable to prepare to exit foster care absent
childcare services. For a single parent to work or attend school, she must
have someone to look after her child. Among the survey states, Illinois and
California alone explicitly provide childcare for all parenting wards. In
New York, while childcare is not mandated by statute or regulation, there
is a written state policy to provide childcare to parenting wards where,
absent such services, the ward would have to choose between participating
in work or school and maintaining custody of her child.251
Where childcare is not mandated by statute or regulation, the right may
nevertheless be inferred from the state's duty to prepare foster youth for
independent living. For example, while New York law does not contain an
outright duty for the state to provide childcare to parenting wards, such a
duty is implied by two underlying mandates: the provision of preventive
services, including childcare, to families at risk of child protective
intervention, 252 and the provision of independent living services, including
253
vocational and higher education andjob placement, to adolescent wards.

247. See, e.g., Barbara Winter & Maxine A. Ketcher, The Rights of Teen Parents Who are in
Foster Care: A Bronx Legal Services Handbook, YOUTH LAW CENTER, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF
TEENS INOUT-OF-HOME CARE 19 (rev. Aug. 2004), available at http://www.ylc.org/ylcyrht.htm
(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
248. See, e.g., STREET LAW, INC., TEEN PARENTS AND THE LAW PROGRAM: TEACHING YOUNG
PARENTS PRACTICAL LAW AND LIFE SKILLS, available at http://www.streetlaw.org/tpal.asp (last

visited Mar. 28, 2006).
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.

CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002.5 (2005).
CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 16002.5; ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 8, § 302 app. J (1996).
See 94 ADM-12, supra note 78.
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 423.4(g)(2) (2005).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 430.12(f).
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The state cannot meet the latter mandate with respect to parenting wards
absent the provision of childcare.
Like New York, most states have rules mandating that preventative
services be provided to at-risk families as well as regulations regarding the
provision of independent living services to foster youth. Lawyers should
use these regulations to obtain childcare for their clients. If made to the
presiding judge, a plea for an order that the district provide childcare
should always be accompanied by an argument that the provision of such
services is in the ward's best interest.
D. Education
Under title IX of the Civil Rights Act,254 pregnant and parenting wards,
and pregnant and parenting students in general, have the same rights to a
public education as all other students. This includes both classes and
extracurricular activities. The majority of parenting wards are within the
mandatory school age of their state and thus must attend school regularly
or face serious repercussions.255 Moreover, completing a high school
education or obtaining a GED are essential steps for any teen parent to
achieve employment and income stability in the future.
Parenting students, however, face significant challenges in continuing
with school during pregnancy and after the birth of their children.25
Primary among these is securing affordable, safe, and accessible childcare
for their babies while they are in school. To ensure that mothers can focus
on their schoolwork without distraction and care for their children,
including breast-feeding if they so choose, schools should provide on-site

254. 20 U.S.C. § 1681; 34 C.F.R. § 106.40. Title IX covers only those schools which receive
money from the federal government, but this includes virtually all schools.
255. For instance, the mandatory school age in New York State is up to and including 16 years
old. N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3202 (2005). New York City has opted to extend it to 17. Students in New
York have the right to attend school until the end of the year in which they turn 21 years old. §
3202(1).
256. Although educational challenges for pregnant students are beyond the scope of this
Article, they are related to those facing parenting students. Many of the students who "drop out"
of school while they are pregnant never return to the educational system after giving birth. For an
in-depth discussion of the barriers facing pregnant and parenting students, see Tamara S. Ling,
Lifting Voices: Toward Equal Educationfor PregnantandParentingStudents in New York City,
29 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 2387 (2002); Aleeza Strubel & Wendy Pollock, Illinois Advocates Promote
School Success and Safety for Young People Who Are Expectant Parents, Parents, or Victims of
Domestic or Sexual Violence, Clearinghouse Review (July-Aug. 2005); Monica J. Stamm, A
Skeleton in the Closet: Single-Sex Schoolsfor PregnantGirls,98 COLUM. L. REv. 1203 (1998). If
they do return to school, they will often have accumulated significant educational deficits during
their time away from school. Unfortunately, they do not often receive assistance in overcoming
these deficits or the other challenges they encounter.
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childcare. While some schools already provide childcare, not
258 nearly
enough do so.257 Those that do have long waiting lists for entry.
Another educational barrier for teen parents is the distance they must
travel between their homes, their babies' daycare provider, and their
schools. School hours may also be a barrier, for example, very early start
times which are incompatible with childcare hours. Schools also lack
flexibility in educational programs and services offered. Many children in
foster care have disabilities259 and have the right to special classes and
services under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA). 26" These
programs are not offered at many schools, and are often not available at
those schools serving parenting teens. 261 Also, schools for pregnant and
parenting teens often do not include advanced or otherwise specialized
courses, while high schools offering such courses usually do not include
childcare or other support services for minor parents.262
Advocates can work with local schools to expand the array of options
for young parents. In particular, teens and school officials should be
informed about rights under title IX and other laws such as the rights to
not be segregated and to have the same educational opportunities available
to other students. Advocates can also work with minors and their schools
to craft attendance and academic policies that accommodate parents'
schedules, and allow them flexibility in attending school, doing course
work, and caring for their children.263 They can also ensure that schools
follow the law in excusing a pregnant or parenting student's absences for

257. For instance, as of2004, the LYFE program in New York City provided on-site childcare
and parenting classes to about 500 teen mothers at schools and educational programs, but city
statistics show that there are more than 20,000 school aged mothers in New York City, 8,000 of
whom are within the mandatory school age. Office of the City Comptroller, Undercounted and
Underserved: New York City's 20,000 School-Aged Young Mothers (June 19, 2003) [hereinafter
City Comptroller], availableat www.comptroller.nyc.gov/bureaus/opm/reports/TeenMothers.pdf.
Moreover, some of the childcare centers are at risk of being closed in the near future. See Deborah
Apsel, Child Care Centers for Teen Mothers May Close (Apr. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.insideschools.org/nv/NV lyfe centers-apr04.php (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
258. City Comptroller, supranote 257.
259. Karen Shelley Smucker et al., School-Related Problems of Special Education FosterCare Students with Emotional or Behavioral Disorders:A Comparison to Other Groups, 4 J.
EMOTIONAL & BEHAV. DISORDERS 30 (1996); Matthew B. Bogin & Beth Goodman, Special
Educationfor Children in State Custody, 7 CHILDREN'S LEGAL RTS. J. 8, 10 (1986).
260. Cynthia Godsoe, Caught Between Two Systems: How ExceptionalChildren in Out-ofHome Care Are Denied Equality in Education, 19 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 81, 91-98.
261. Additionally, teen parents, including those not in foster care, have a high prevalence of
educational deficits and possible undetected learning disabilities. See CENTER FOR ASSESSMENT
AND PoLIcY DEVELOPMENT, HELPING THE EDUCATION SYSTEM WORK FOR TEEN PARENTS AND

THEIR CHILDREN (Oct. 1999).
262. Id.
263. Id.
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medical reasons as they would for any other medical condition. 2" Finally,
advocates can argue that educational services form an inherent part of both
the independent living services which must be provided to foster youth,
and of the reasonable efforts required to keep families together or reunify
families.
E. Family Planning
While many campaigns and policies focus on preventing teen
pregnancy - or on preventing unmarried teens from engaging in sexual
intercourse - preventing young mothers from having a second child is
equally important.265 More than one in five teen mothers has more than
one child.2" As compared to teen mothers with only one child, teen
mothers with more than one child face lower educational and vocational
attainment, a greater risk of poverty, heavier reliance on public assistance,
and impaired infant health and well-being.2 67 Preventing second births is
particularly important to stopping the generational foster care cycle.
Research indicates that second and higher-order children are more likely
to become victims of child abuse or neglect and to be placed in foster care
for longer periods of time.268
Given the close relationship between rates of abuse, family size, and
maternal age, advocates for parenting wards should take steps to ensure
that their clients have access to appropriate family planning services. In
general, foster youth have the same right to confidential reproductive
healthcare as other youth. In all four of the survey states, state laws permit
minors to obtain contraception, testing, and treatment for sexually
transmitted diseases, and abortion services absent parental consent. 269 Not
surprisingly, those states which permit minors to obtain confidential
family planning services are more likely to have rules specifically
mandating that family planning services be provided to youth in foster

264. Id.
265. For a study on preventing initial pregnancies among foster youth, see LOIS THIESSEN
LOVE ET AL., FOSTERING HOPE: PREVENTING TEEN PREGNANCY AMONG YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE

(2005).
266. FLORENCIA M. GREER & JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN, CTR. FOR LAW AND SOC. POLICY, MORE
THAN ONE: TEEN MOTHERS AND SUBSEQUENT CHILD BEARING 2 (Aug. 1998), available at

http://www.clasp.org/publications/more-than-one-teen-mothers.pdf(last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
267. Id. at 2, 4.
268. Id. at 4-5.
269. Boonstra & Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, in THE
GUTTENMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 68, at 6-7.
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care upon request. Among the survey states, New York and Illinois both
carry such a mandate.270
In many other states, however, there is either no law permitting minors
to access contraceptive services, or there are laws restricting minors'
access to such services.27' While a foster child's right to access
confidential family planning services varies from state to state, all states
must make family planning services and supplies available to foster
children under the Federal Early Periodic Screening, Diagnosis, and
Treatment (EPSDT) program. 272 EPSDT is a comprehensive bundle of
medical services which must be made available to persons under twentyone enrolled in Medicaid.2 73 The vast majority of foster youth are
Medicaid eligible, and hence entitled to EPSDT services.274 It is unclear
whether minors in foster care have the right to independently access
reproductive services covered by EPSDT in those states which otherwise
require minors seeking contraceptive or abortion services to obtain
parental consent.
Locating adolescent family planning services may also be difficult,
particularly in rural areas or in states such as Texas and Utah, where the
legislatures have prohibited the use of state funds in providing confidential
contraceptive services to minors.2 75 At the same time, the federal
government has greatly curtailed funding for adolescent reproductive
healthcare in favor of abstinence-only sexual education.276

270. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18 § 507.1 (c)(9) (2005); ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89 §
302.350 (2005).
271. Boonstra & Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, in THE
GUTrENMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 68, at 6-7. For example, Delaware,
Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Oklahoma, and Oregon, all permit the health
provider to notify the minor's parents. Id.
272. See 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396a(a)(10), 1396a(a)(43), 1396d(a)(4)(B), 1396d(r) (2005).
273. JANE PERKINS, NAT'L HEALTH LAW PROGRAM, FACT SHEET: EARLY & PERIODIC
SCREENING, DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT, availableat http://www.healthlaw.org/library.cfin?fa=
download&resourcelD=64084&appView=folder&folderlD=57647&print (last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
274. KATHLEEN MCNAUGHT & LAUREN ONKELES, NAT'L RES. CTR. FOR YOUTH DEV.,
IMPROVING OUTCOMES FOR OLDER YOUTH: WHAT JUDGES AND ATTORNEYS NEED TO KNOW, at 35,
availableatwww.nrcys.ou.edu/nrcyd/publications/pdfs/improveoutcomes.pdf(last visited Mar. 28,
2006).
275. Boonstra & Nash, Minors and the Right to Consent to Health Care, in THE
GUTTENMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 68, at 5.
276. Of the $19 million in AFLA funding available in FY 2000, only a small proportion approximately $4 million - was available for projects to provide reproductive healthcare and
counseling. Cynthia Dailard, Reviving Interest in Policies and Programs to Help Teens Prevent
Repeat Births, in THE GUTTMACHER REPORT ON PUBLIC POLICY, supra note 68, at 1, 11. The

remainder of the funds were restricted to projects which adhere to a stringent eight-point definition
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These barriers to access are compounded in states or localities where
foster care services are provided by sectarian agencies. In New York City,
for example, the local child welfare agency contracts with over thirty
nonprofit agencies to provide placement, daily care, and case planning
services to youth in foster care." As their names - Catholic Guardian,
Jewish Board of Children and Family Services, the Salvation Army indicate, many of these agencies are religiously affiliated. The Catholic
agencies have historically refused to allow their staff to provide family
planning information and services to children in the agencies' care.27
In Wilder v. Sugarman,2 79 advocates brought suit against New York
City and its contract agencies, claiming that the arrangement violated the
Establishment Clause of the Constitution.28 The ensuing settlement stated
that Catholic agencies did not have to provide reproductive health
services, but had to make the children available to the City, which would
provide the services and instruction itself.281 The settlement was vacated
in 1998.282 Currently, the local child welfare agency does not provide such
instruction, and no policy is in place to ensure that children placed with
Catholic agencies - or any other agency, for that matter - have
meaningful access to contraceptive and abortion services.
F. Servicesfor Fathers
Although most wards who live with and assume primary care for their
children are female, it is likely that a significant number of young men in
foster care are also parents. Once again, among the states surveyed here,
Illinois offers the only relevant data. In 2003, 16%, or approximately 158,
of pregnant and parenting wards in Cook County and the surrounding
counties were male.283 However, in contrast with pregnant and parenting
females, it is relatively easy for a young man to conceal his status as a
father, expectant or otherwise; a status of which he may in fact be

of abstinence-only education, in which even the discussion of contraception beyond failure rates
is prohibited. Id.
277. For a list of ACS contract agencies, see Administration for Children's Service
Introductory Booklet, at 20, availableat www.nyc.gov/html/acs/html/about/about.shtml.
278. See BERNSTEIN, supra note 55, at 322-23, 331-32.
279. 385 F. Supp. 1013 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
280. Id. at 1017-18. See also Wilder v. Bernstein, 499 F. Supp. 980 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Wilder
v. Bernstein, 645 F. Supp. 1292 (S.D.N.Y. 1986), affd, 848 F.2d 1338 (2d Cir. 1988). For an in-depth
analysis of the suit, see BERNSTEIN, supranote 55.
281. BERNSTEIN, supranote 55, at 322-23, 331-32.
282. Settlement Agreement at paragraph 30, entered December 2, 1998, Marisol v. Pataki
(S.D.N.Y.) (No. 95-10533) (dismissing with prejudice the Wilder case on consent of the parties).
283. TPSN, supra note 129.
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ignorant. Thus, it is likely that the numbers listed above under-represent
the number of young fathers in foster care.
Social science research similarly indicates that males who are or have
been in foster care are more likely then their counterparts to be teen
fathers. One study found that men who had been exposed to one of three
factors - childhood physical abuse, a battered mother, or childhood
sexual abuse - were more likely than other men to be involved in a teen
pregnancy.284 In fact, the study found that "more frequent exposure to
physical abuse, a battered mother, or sexual abuse that occurs at younger
ages or involves threats or violence all approximately double a male's risk
of impregnating a teenage girl - during both adolescence and
adulthood."285 Young men in foster care are disproportionately likely to
have been exposed to the three risk factors identified by the researchers.
It is thus likely that they are at heightened risk of involvement in a teen
pregnancy.
Despite the evidence that males in foster care face a heightened risk of
impregnating a teenaged girl and becoming a father at an early age, Illinois
is the only state surveyed here with a written policy regarding the
provision of services to fathers in care. Illinois regulations state that "the
needs, rights and responsibilities of young fathers . . . are equally
important and should also receive full attention in the provision of
' Services to which fathers are entitled
services."286
include placements that
support and encourage them to care for their children, day care services,
counseling, and parenting classes.287 Finally, workers in Illinois are
mandated to provide fathers with information about the Putative Father
Registry, child support, and the establishment of paternity.288
Unfortunately, data indicate that the state is having a difficult time meeting
these mandates.289
G. DischargePlanning
Foster youth who "age-out" to independent living are at severe risk of
homelessness. Across the country, a disproportionate number of homeless

284. See Robert F. Anda et al., AbusedBoys, BatteredMothers,andMale Involvement in Teen
Pregnancy,PEDIATRICS, Feb. 2001.
285. Id. at 8.
286. ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89, § 302.350, app. J (1996).
287. Id.
288. Id.
289. TPSN, supra note 129, FY 2002, at 18 (noting that "the identification of male parenting"
foster youth in the Chicago area "has been an ongoing challenge").
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people have a foster care history.29° For example, almost half of the
homeless youth interviewed in a Chicago study reported that they had been
wards ofthe Illinois DCFS.2 9' In addition, homeless individuals with foster
care histories become homeless at an earlier age and remain homeless for
longer periods of time than other homeless individuals.292
Mothers with a history of foster care are at particular risk of
homelessness. The vast majority of such women are unmarried and receive
little or no support from their children's fathers, who tend to be poor
themselves. Friends and relatives who have a spare couch for one person
may balk when that person brings along a toddler and a crying baby.
Landlords who rent individual rooms and studios prefer single tenants to
those with children. The cost of basic necessities for their children, such
as diapers and baby formula, drains away what little income former wards
may have to pay for housing.
Most disturbingly, examining the connection between homelessness
and foster care reveals a generational cycle of foster care placement.
Homeless parents in New York City who grew up in foster care are almost
twice as likely as parents without such a history to have their children
placed in the system.2 93 Similarly, a nationwide survey of homeless
families in shelters showed that 77% of parents with a foster care history
had at least one child who was or had been in foster care, as compared
with 27% of parents without such a history.294
The issue of housing is perhaps the most intractable one for advocates
representing individual foster youth. An advocate cannot help a client
locate affordable housing if none exists, nor can he or she increase the
client's patently insufficient wages or monthly public benefit grant to an
amount that would permit the client to obtain housing at market rates.
Rather, the problem of housing for former foster youth, and the problem
of homelessness in general, is best addressed on a systemic level beyond
the scope of this Article. Nevertheless, there are concrete steps advocates
can take on behalf of their clients to reduce the risk and duration of
homelessness.
Advocates can reduce the age at which clients face homelessness by
ensuring they remain in care as long as possible. First, advocates should
fight for appropriate placements for their clients, such that their clients are

290. N.P. ROMAN & P.B. WOLF, NAT'L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, WEB OF FAILURE:
THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN FOSTER CARE AND HOMELESSNESS

(1995),

available at

http://www.endhomelessness.org/pub/fostercare/webrept.htm.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. RALPH DA COSTA NUNEZ, THE NEW POVERTY: HOMELESS FAMILIES IN AMERICA (1996),
ch. 5, Family Preservation: The Foster Care Connection.
294. ROMAN & WOLF, supra note 290.
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willing to remain in foster care as long as permitted - until the age of 18,
19, or 21, depending on the state. 295 Far too many foster youth run away
from foster care placements only to end up homeless. While youth run
away for myriad and complex reasons, many leave because of the
conditions of their current placement. Young mothers leave their group
homes because of indifferent or abusive staff, staff s refusal to allow them
to visit with their children's fathers, and staffs constant and coercive
threats to remove their children from their care.2 96 In addition, youth who
have been subject to multiple changes in placement experience a sense of
hopelessness and worthlessness. 9' Running away - choosing for
themselves where they will live - is an attempt at self-determination.298
To prevent a young mother from leaving care prematurely, an advocate
must help her identify the type of placement she feels would best meet her
needs. Does the client feel safe in her current placement? Does her current
placement allow her access to the people and institutions - her child's
father, her school, her old neighborhood - on which she relies for
support? Or does her current placement render those resources
geographically inaccessible? Is she more comfortable in a foster family
home or in a group home? Advocates should demand that the system
provide each client with an appropriate placement, and, when necessary,
should ask the judge to order a change of placement.
In addition, advocates must ensure that their clients receive the
independent living services to which they are entitled. Agencies are
particularly likely to deny independent living services to pregnant and
parenting teens, mistakenly assuming that their status as parents renders
them ineligible.299 If foster youth are receiving services they value from
295. In Florida, youth age-out at 18 but may petition a court to retain jurisdiction for an
additional year, until they turn 18. FLA. STAT. ch. 39.013; N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1087(a) (youth ageout in New York at 21); ILL. COMP. STAT. ch. 705 (youth may remain in care until 21 if certain
findings are made by a court in Illinois); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 303 (youth may remain in
care until 21 if certain findings are made by a court in California).
296. MADELYN FREUNDLICH, CHILDREN'S RIGHTS, INC., JUVENILE RIGHTS DIVISION OF THE
LEGAL AID SOCIETY, LAWYERS FOR CHILDREN, TIME RUNNING OUT: TEENS IN FOSTER CARE

(2003).
297. MARK COURTNEY ET AL., YOUTH WHO RUN AWAY FROM SUBSTITUTE CARE, CHAPIN

HALL CENTER FOR CHILDREN 32, 31 (2005) (finding that placement instability is positively
correlated with the likelihood that a foster child will run away from care).
298. Id. at 46, 52-54 (finding that the struggle for autonomy (i.e. the ability to make choices)
is a major theme in the patterns of motivation that cause foster youth to run away).
299. Kathi Grasso, Litigatingthe IndependentLiving Case, ABA CHILD LAW PRACTICE, Vol.
18(8), Oct. 1999 (observing that "pregnant women and young mothers [are] often denied
independent living services" and discussing a case in which the local child protection agency
responded to her teen client's pregnancy by attempting to terminate foster care services, and how
she and her client overcame the agency's efforts to do so), availableat http://www.abanet.org/
child/converted.html (last visited Mar. 28, 2006).
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the system, such as career and college counseling, vocational education,
or tutoring, they are more likely to stay in care.
Next, advocates must challenge the premature discharge of their clients
from the system. In most states, foster children can remain in care until
age eighteen. Among the survey states, New York, Illinois, and California
allow foster youth to remain in care until age twenty-one under certain
circumstances. In New York, foster youth have a right to remain in care
if they are in school, engaged in vocational training, or lack the skills or
ability to live independently.3" In addition, New York's regulations
prohibit the discharge of a child from foster care to homelessness.3"'
Illinois's standard is narrower; the presumption is that a child's
dependency will terminate at eighteen, but the law provides for an
exception "for good cause when there is satisfactory evidence presented
to the court and the court makes written factual findings that the health,
safety and best interest of the minor and the public require the continuation
of the wardship. 30 2
In 2000, California amended its own law on this point." 3 Although
previous law had granted thejuvenile court discretion to retain jurisdiction
over a foster child between the ages of eighteen and twenty-one, 30 4 it was
common practice for judges to terminate jurisdiction at eighteen.3" 5 The
new law requires that, at a hearing to terminate jurisdiction, the county
must establish that it has fulfilled several duties to the child, including:
ensuring the child is present in court; providing the ward with his or her
personal identity documents; assisting the ward in applying for health
insurance, transitional housing, college or vocational education, and
employment or other financial support; and, where appropriate, informing
the ward of the whereabouts of his or her siblings. 6 Nevertheless, the
county's failure to do so does not entitle the child to remain in foster care,
but merely permits the judge, in his or her discretion, to continue the
child's placement until these obligations are met.30 7 The judge also has

300. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 427.2(c)(1) (2005).
301. N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 18, § 430.12(f)(3)(c) (2005).
302. 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/2-31(1),(3) (2005).
303. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 391 (2005).
304. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 303.
305. Cal. Senate Rules Comm., Office of Senate Floor Analyses, 3d reading analysis of
Assembly Bill No. 686 (1999-2000 Regular Sess.) as amended Aug. 29, 2000 (stating that
"although the juvenile court has the authority to retain jurisdiction over a dependent child until the
age of 21, the reality is that federal funding for foster youth ends at the age of 18 and common
practice is for the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction at that time.").
306. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 391.
307. See § 391(c).
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discretion to continue jurisdiction "for other reasons."3 8 Conversely, the
law specifically states that a court may terminate jurisdiction where the
ward has refused services or cannot be located "after reasonable
efforts."3 09
Even in states with such provisions, courts and agencies regularly close
the cases of youth who have not yet reached the age of twenty-one. Rather
than making the determination to extend or terminate placement based on
the young person's best interests, courts and agencies often make case
based on whether a particular ward is deemed
closure decisions
",cooperative.,,310 Too often, courts, agencies, and even children's attorneys
have adopted this approach, and accept the departure from the requisite
statutory standard without question. Instead, advocates must know the
standard for extending placement until or beyond age eighteen, and be
prepared to demonstrate to a court that the facts of a particular child's case
meet that standard.31'
In In re NatashaH.,312 the lawyer for a sixteen year-old foster child in
California successfully appealed the juvenile court's termination of her
client's dependency. 3 3 Natasha had run away from every one of her
placements and, at the time of the termination, had been away for almost
two years. 314 The juvenile court found that the minor was four months
pregnant, living on the streets, and had no source of income.31 5
Nevertheless, it released Natasha to "her own custody., 31 6 The Appellate
Court reversed. While acknowledging that Natasha had "resisted efforts
to help at every turn," the Appellate Court found that neither a minor
ward's wish to rid herself of court supervision nor the county's desire to
rid itself of "the burden of a troublesome child" justified the termination
of dependency where the child was desperately in need of services and
termination was patently contrary to her best interests.317
Advocates should also assist clients who have run away or have been
improperly discharged to re-enter the system. This is particularly difficult
where the young person has already reached age eighteen. For example,
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. MCNAuGHT & ONKELES, supra note 274, at 7 (noting the prevalence of "unnecessary
discharges from care due to 'noncompliance' that may actually result from a youth's normal,
developmentally appropriate, behavior."); see also Laurene Heybach & Stacey Platt, Termination
of Older Youth from FosterCare: A Protocolfor Illinois, PuB. INT. L. REP. (Spr. 2000).
311. Grasso, supra note 299.
312. In re Natasha H., 46 Cal. App. 4th 1151 (3d App. Dist. 1996).
313. Id.
314. Id.at 1153-54.
315. Id.at 1154.
316. Id. at 1151.
317. Natasha,46 Cal. App. 4th at 1153, 1158.
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in In re Holly H.,318 a California Appellate Court affirmed an order by the
juvenile court terminating the dependency of a nineteen year-old ward.3 19
Holly had been in foster care since the age of three, and had been
diagnosed with a severe learning disability, lupus and kidney disease, and
dysthymic disorder.32 The court held that the appropriate standard for the
termination ofjurisdiction was "whether termination would give rise to' an
321
existing or reasonably foreseeable future harm to the young adult."
While acknowledging that Holly had no stable housing, no source of
income, and lacked the ability to manage her finances, the court noted that
she was legally an adult and had indicated her desire to be free of the
system by leaving her group home and consistently refusing services
offered by the county. 32' The court thus found that Holly's "continued
participating in the juvenile dependency system
cannot reasonably be
3 23
expected to prevent any future harm" to her.
Nonetheless, lawyers have had significant success in enforcing the
rights of older youth - even those who have reached age eighteen - to the
protection of the family court particularly when the youth in question
expressed a strong wish to remain under court supervision.324 For example,
in In Re Shawn B,325 the Illinois Appellate Court granted a minor's counsel
leave to petition the juvenile court to resume jurisdiction over the minor
at any time prior to the minor's twenty-first birthday, should the minor
require further care, protection, or education. 326 Finally, where the agency
or district has failed to plan appropriately for the child's discharge,

318. In re Holly H., 104 Cal. App. 4th 1324 (1 st App. Dist. 2002).
319. Id.
320. Id.at 1328.
321. Id. at 1336.
322. Id. at 1337.
323. Holly, 104 Cal. App. 4th at 1337.
324. But see, e.g., In re Robert L., 68 Cal. App. 4th 789 (1998) (reversing a trial court's
decision to maintain jurisdiction over siblings, 18 and 20, at their request, to facilitate their college
attendance).
325. 578 N.E.2d 269 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991).
326. The court noted that:
[t]uming Shawn B. and other young people like him out to fend for themselves
merely because they have reached the age of 18, without ensuring that they are
prepared to become useful and independent members of society, does an injustice
to both the minor and society and fails to satisfy the court's statutory obligation
to act in the best interest of the child.
Id.at 274. But see, contra,In re Bettie Jo R., 660 N.E.2d 52, 55-56 (I11.
App. Ct. 1995) (upholding
the Circuit Court's termination of care of a 19-year-old parenting ward, despite the fact that she
relied on the foster care agency to pay her tuition and day care costs, on the ground that her best
interest did not necessitate the continuation of her wardship).
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advocates should argue that the agency is obliged to continue to shelter the
child until alternative arrangements can be made.
VI. CONCLUSION

Youth who have children themselves raise significant dilemmas for
child advocates. In some respects, parenting wards call into question the
very notion of "children's rights." After all, which child do we seek to
protect - the struggling teen or vulnerable infant? In many situations, the
minor parent's and child's interests are aligned in remaining together,
presenting the possibility of a mutually beneficial outcome. Nevertheless,
hard cases exist in which the interests of the ward and her child clearly
diverge. 7 Even if parents and children are kept together, the failure of the
foster care system to prepare youth for economic self-sufficiency in
adulthood leaves mother and child at an increased risk of poverty and
homelessness.
The overlay of racial bias and economic inequality is impossible to
ignore. A disproportionate number of the families involved in the child
protective system are poor and African American.32 When foster youth who are already disproportionately poor and minority - lose their
children to the system, the social inequalities that contributed to the wards'
initial placement are revisited upon a second generation. As Dorothy
Roberts writes,
Without careful attention to social justice, rights tend to reinforce
social hierarchies and benefit the most privileged members of
society. To be just, children's rights must be part of a broader
327. A tragic recent case in Florida illustrates this point. A 20-year-old former foster child,
Yusimil Herrera, is being prosecuted for first degree murder in the beating death of her three-yearold daughter, Angel. Herrera had her child while in foster care. As a teenager she and her sister,
Tasha Ruiz, won a suit against the state child welfare agency for physical and sexual abuse they
suffered in foster care beginning at the ages of two and five. Herrera was allegedly never provided
with independent living skills or other services that would have helped her transition to adulthood.
See Abby Goodnough, Youth Who Won Abuse Suit is Held in Daughter'sKilling,N.Y. TIMES, May
19, 2004, at A16. One month after Angel's death, in May 2004, Herrera had her second child, who
was immediately taken into foster care and placed with Herrera's mother. See Carol Marbin Miller,
Mom, 20, FacingMurder Charge,Loss ofNewborn, MIAMI HERALD, June 9, 2004. In June 2005,
the Florida Department of Children and Families removed Tasha Herrera's four children from her
care, claiming she was "too overwhelmed" to care for them properly. Tragically, Tasha had tried
to protect her niece Angel by calling the state's child abuse hotline and begging investigators to
take Angel into protective custody. See Carol Marbin Miller, Whistle-Blower's Kids Put In DCF's
Custody, MIAMI HERALD (June 9, 2005).
328. Robert B. Hill, Disportionality of Minorities in Child Welfare: Synthesis of Research
Finding, available at http://www.racemattersconsortium.org/docs/whopaper4.pdf/.
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struggle to eradicate oppressive structures that imprison children
and to create a more egalitarian society that cherishes all
children.32 9
The current system's failure to support parenting wards creates foster care
"legacy" families, every generation of which is raised in the statecontrolled environment of foster care. Upon having children of her own,
a foster child must parent beneath the shadow of a judge, gavel in hand,
poised to remove her children forever. The vindication of "children's
rights" may promote the protection of certain children from certain forms
of harm, but it is not helpful in ending this cycle.
In fact, it is possible that a narrow focus on children's rights has led
advocates to overlook the plight of parenting wards. The population is
nearly invisible in the academic literature of both law and the social
sciences, in state policies, in practice guides for children's attorneys and
guardians ad litem, and in the demographic data on children in foster care.
Worse still, states have failed to take advantage of the resources that are
available. Although the federal government will reimburse states for the
care of a parenting ward and child who are placed together (provided the
child remains in the ward's custody), only one of the four survey states New York - appear to take full advantage of this. Most disturbingly,
advocates across the country report that states and counties frequently
violate parenting ward's due process rights by coercing teens into
"voluntarily" placing their child in government custody, separating wards
from their children absent proper judicial findings, and threatening to
remove infants from the ward's care based on infractions which do not
pose an imminent risk of harm to the baby. By raising these issues,
gathering what information exists, and presenting best practices from
around the country, we hope to start a conversation which will lead to
greater attention to the needs of parenting wards and their children.

329. Dorothy E. Roberts, Is There Justice in Children's Rights?: The Critique of Federal
Family PreservationPolicy. 2 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 112, 140 (1999).
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